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Articles 
FIXING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ABSURDITY OF THE APPORTIONMENT 
OF DIRECT TAX 
Calvin H. Johnson* 
The Constitution requires that direct taxes be apportioned 
among the states according to population.1 Before the abolition 
* Professor Law, University of Texas. A table of short form citations to fre-
quently cited documentary sources is found in the Appendix. 
1. The Constitution of the United States provides: 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several 
States ... according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by 
adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service 
for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, (but including] three-
fifths of all other Persons. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
The three-fifths of "all other Persons" referred to slaves, but the Thirteenth Amendment 
abolished slavery. 
See also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 4 (providing that "[n]o Capitation, or other direct, 
Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before di-
rected to be taken"). 
Recent contributions to the literature in favor of application of apportionment in-
clude OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 49, 
92-93 (1993) (praising the application of apportionment to render taxation impossible 
except possibly in time of war); Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": 
Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334 (1997) (arguing that 
consumption taxes, except sales tax, would need to be apportioned); Erik M. Jensen, The 
Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of "Incomes," 33 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1057 (2001) reprinted as shortened, 97 TAX NOTES 99 (2002) (arguing that appor-
tionment should not be avoided by judicial construction of word "income"); Erik M. Jen-
sen, The Constitwion Matters in Tax, 100 TAX NOTES 821 (2003) (urging that we take the 
apportionment clause seriously and claiming that all taxes except income taxes and taxes 
resembling sales taxes must be apportioned). 
Recent contributions that seek to avoid apportionment include Bruce Ackerman, 
Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing that the Sixteenth 
Amendment enables Congress and not the courts to decide what to tax); Marjorie Korn-
hauser, The Constitwional Meaning of Income and the Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. 
REV. 1 (1992) (arguing that "income" within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment is 
inherently malleable); Lawrence Zelenak, Radical Reform, the Constitution, and the Con-
scientious Legislator, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1999) (arguing that current proposals for 
federal consumption tax can be considered either as income taxes or as not direct taxes). 
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of slavery, the formula for apportionment counted each slave as 
three-fifths of a free person. Indeed, apportionment of tax was 
brought into the Constitution to impose a disincentive on slav-
ery. An apportioned or direct tax is like a requisition from a 
state with each state having a quota to satisfy, except that the 
Congress determines the objects and rates of tax and collects the 
state quota directly from individuals. Apportionment requires 
that federal tax rates must vary among the states so that two 
states with the same population, counting slaves as required, will 
have the same tax payment. 
Apportionment of tax among the states by population turns 
out to be an absurd requirement, almost always impossible or 
else so perverse in effect that no democracy, indeed no rational 
government, could adopt it. Apportionment by population preys 
upon poor states, requiring tax rates to be highest where the tax 
base is thinnest. Apportionment by state can force an entire 
state's quota to fall upon a few taxpayers, perhaps upon a single 
innocent taxpayer. We now know that the drafters of the Consti-
tution did not see the perversities. The framers said kind things 
about apportionment of tax that are impossible to reconcile with 
its unavoidable effects. 
The apportionment clause has had an accidental but ven-
omous effect on federal tax policy over the years. The Sixteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution now allows a federal income tax 
without apportionment among the states. Apportionment, how-
ever, threatens to make a tax unconstitutional if Congress strays 
beyond some narrow and silly definition of "income." Basing 
federal income tax on "unrealized" changes in fair market value, 
for instance, is probably the only way to solve some very knotty 
problems in tax policy and to minimize the damage that taxation 
does to the economy.2 It is argued, however, that a tax on unre-
I have argued that apportionment is not required whenever it is unreasonable. See Cal-
vin H. Johnson, Purging ow Pollock: The Constitutionality of Federal Wealth or Sales Taxes, 
97 TAX NoTES 1723 (2002); Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-
up in the Core of the Constillltion, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1998) shortened version 
reprinted in, The CollStitwional Meaning of "Apportionment of Direct Taxes," 80 TAX 
NOTES 591 (Aug. 3, 1998), reprinted 15 STATE TAX NOTES 413 (Aug. 17, 1998). 
2. For serious arguments that tax without realization would improve the tax sys-
tem in various contexts, see, for example, Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Inno-
vation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV. 460, 474 (1993); Mark P. Gergen & 
Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax Law on Securities Innovation in the United States: 
1981-1997, 52 TAX L. REV. 119, 124 (1998); Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxa-
tion: Norms and Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817, 1821 (1990); Joseph Dodge, A 
Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration Pro-
posal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265 (1995). 
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alized amounts is not constitutional because unrealized amounts 
are not income under the Sixteenth Amendment and because 
tax on unrealized amounts is a direct tax that fails because it 
cannot be apportioned.3 There have been calls from the right for 
replacing federal income tax with a national consumption tax or 
sales tax4 and calls from the left for enacting a federal wealth 
tax.5 Apportionment is said to cast vetoes in both directions. 6 
Depending on your politics, the killing effect of apportionment is 
sometimes a tragedy and sometimes a lucky strike. Still, none of 
it has anything to do with the values and purposes that created 
the constitutional requirement-or with rational tax policy. The 
killing effect in random directions cannot be consistently or co-
herently right. 
This article argues that nothing in the original meaning of 
apportionment justifies treating apportionment as a barrier to 
any federal tax. Apportionment was brought into the Constitu-
tion, in the midst of a debate about determining representation 
in Congress, so as to discourage the South from acquiring more 
slaves. The critical aspect, originally, was that slaves would be 
included in the count at three-fifths. "Direct tax" in 1787 was a 
synonym for "apportioned tax," and the meaning of the term 
varied according to whether the tax was apportioned at the fed-
eral level. The best understanding of the original bargain, ac-
cordingly, is that the mandatory remedy was not that any taxes 
should be apportioned, but rather that the slaves had to be in-
cluded in the calculation of Southern taxes, counted at three-
fifths, should Congress choose to apportion a tax. There is no 
evidence in the original debates that anyone, whether in favor of 
3. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920) (invalidating a federal tax on 
stock dividends because stock dividends were not income within the meaning of the Six-
teenth Amendment); Leon Gabinet & Ronald J. Coffey, The Implications of the Eco-
nomic Concept of Income for Corporation-Shareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 895,926 (1977) (arguing that apportionment prevents a shareholder tax on 
undistributed corporate earnings); JohnS. Nolan, The Merit In Conformity of Tax to Fi-
nancial Accounting, 50 TAXES 761, 767-69 (1972) (arguing that prepaid receipts are not 
taxable under the Constitution); Henry Ordower, Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxa-
tion, the Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1993) (argu-
ing that economic improvements achieved while avoiding incoming cash cannot be con-
stitutionally taxed as income). 
4. See, e.g., J.C.S. 18-95, 104'h Cong. (1st Sess. 1995) (Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion's "Description and Analysis of Proposals to Replace the Federal Income Tax" from 
June 5, 1995). 
5. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOIT, THE STAKEHOLDER 
SOCIETY (1999) (advocating a capital grant to young adults, funded by a federal wealth 
tax). 
6. Jensen, The Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1057. 
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or opposed to federal direct tax, thought of apportionment as 
preventing any federal tax. For better or worse, both proponents 
and opponents of the Constitution called the power to lay direct 
taxes "unrestricted." The grand purpose of the Constitution was 
to give Congress such tax powers as necessary to pay Revolu-
tionary War debts. A serious restraint on tax in that context 
would have been unthinkable. 
When the Constitution was young and flexible, the Supreme 
Court, still composed of Founders, avoided the nonsense of ap-
portionment by interpretation. The Supreme Court held in Hyl-
ton v. United States1 in 1796 that where apportionment was un-
reasonable, the tax was therefore not "direct." That wise 
interpretation survived for 100 years and justified federal tax, for 
instance, on income, corporate capital, and estates. 
In 1895, however, Pollock came into the garden. By a mar-
gin of five to four, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust8 overruled 
the Hylton line of cases and used the apportionment require-
ment to strike down a federal income tax. Pollock concocted a 
history and rationale for apportionment that was the opposite of 
the original meaning. Apportionment arose to reach the wealth 
of the states, using numbers as a measure of wealth, but Pollock 
supposed that apportionment must have been intended to pro-
tect wealth and wealthy states from assault by mere numbers. 
Pollock is a model of bad judicial behavior. The majority Jus-
tices used apportionment as a convenient excuse to kill a federal 
tax that the Justices disliked for private political reasons. Their 
interpretation displayed their ignorance of the true historical ra-
tionale. Shallow readings of constitutional text are dangerous 
things in willful or ignorant hands. 
Pollock was wrongly decided at the time and elite opinion 
soon turned against it. The Supreme Court began to limit the 
case to its facts, stretching the term "excise tax" to avoid appor-
tionment whenever the requirement was suggested. The nation 
as a whole then reversed Pollock on its facts by overwhelmingly 
enacting the Sixteenth Amendment, which allowed an income 
tax without apportionment among the states. 
It is time now to overrule Pollock in full and to return to 
Hylton. Pollock can be and has been contained by manipulative 
definition of "excise tax" or "income" so that the case is avoid-
able in every instance. Pollock is dead on its holding as to the in-
7. 3 U.S. 171 (1796). 
8. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), vacated by 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
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come tax. Indeed, courts have a duty to distinguish Pollock in 
every case. Apportionment is too awful a requirement to en-
force. Since Pollock should never apply, it should be overruled 
outright. A full reversal of Pollock would eliminate apportion-
ment as a constraint on contemporary federal tax policy. "In-
come" could then be defined sensibly by Congress. Congress 
could replace or supplement the income tax with some other tax 
as it wishes. Apportionment would never threaten any federal 
tax. Congress would then decide the issues of tax policy by the 
ordinary process of democracy, unhindered by an absurd re-
quirement. 
Professors William Eskridge and Sandy Levinson recently 
collected essays on constitutional stupidities and tragedies.9 They 
asked various authors to identify the worst feature of the United 
States Constitution. Apportionment of direct tax is a profound 
stupidity. Although slavery, at least, is worse, apportionment of 
direct tax is a constitutional stupidity that we can eliminate with-
out a civil war. Through proper constitutional interpretation, we 
can sure that apportionment of tax will never again be a tragedy. 
I. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE 
APPORTIONMENT REQUIREMENT 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the 
power to lay and collect taxes in order "to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defense and general Welfare." 10 The 
apportionment requirement is found in article I, section 2, which 
requires that both representation in the House of Representa-
tives of the Congress and "direct taxes" shall be apportioned 
among the states according to their respective numbers. Section 
2 further requires that the states' numbers be determined by 
adding the whole number of free persons and three-fifths of all 
slaves. 11 Section 9 repeats the requirement by saying that no 
capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to 
the census. 12 Section 9 also prohibits any tax on exports from the 
9. CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998). 
10. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1. 
11. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3. The text refers to the slaves by the euphemistic "all 
other Pe~ons," but "all other Persons" was understood to refer to the slaves. See, e.g., 
Rufus Kmg, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 17, 1788) in 2 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 36. 
12. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, d. 4. 
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states. 13 Section 8 requires that all duties, imposts, and excises be 
uniform in rate throughout the United States. 14 "Direct tax" is 
not defined, but an apportioned tax cannot have a uniform rate 
in every state, absent impossible assumptions. We can deduce 
therefore that the taxes for which a uniform rate is required-
duties, excises, and imposts-cannot be direct taxes. "Impost" 
was a reference to a tax on imports, now more commonly called 
"tariffs" or "custom duties. "1 "Duty" was apparently a refer-
ence to a stamp tax on legal documents. 16 "Excise tax" referred, 
originally but not exclusively, to tax on whiskey. 17 The original 
Constitution has been amended, first, to end slavery. 18 The Six-
teenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, allows Congress to impose 
a tax on income from whatever source derived, without appor-
tionment among the states. 19 In sum, a tax is constitutional if is 
apportioned among the state, except for export taxes. Even if 
not apportioned, a tax is constitutional if the tax is a duty, excise, 
impost, or income tax. 
A. VOTING BY WEALTH 
1. Population as a Measure Of Wealth 
The rule that tax be apportioned among the states according 
to population was introduced during the debates at the Philadel-
phia Constitutional Convention over the allocation of votes in 
the national legislature. Population, counting slaves at three-
fifths, was consistently understood as a measure of wealth. The 
apportionment formula was intended to allocate votes in Con-
gress according to the comparative wealth of the states. 
At the time of the Convention, there was still ambiguity as 
to whether the government should represent people or property. 
Pierce Butler, delegate from South Carolina, argued, for in-
stance, that wealth was the only just measure of representation, 
13. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, d. 5. 
14. U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 8, d. 1. 
15. In 1783, Congress had proposed, unsuccessfully, that the federal government be 
allowed to impose a 5% "impost," which was a tax on imports. April 18, 1783, 24 J. 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 257 (1783). 
16. See Luther Martin, "Genuine Information," Maryland Legislature (Nov. 29, 
1787), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 203 (saying that "duty" referred to stamps on docu-
ments, but that the phrase "stamp tax" was avoided because of the association with the 
British stamp tax, which had been one of the causes of the Revolution). 
17. See infra note 128. 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
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because property was the "the great object of Govern[men]t" 
and "the great means of carrying ... on" war.20 Delegates who 
wanted votes also to represent IJeople were nonetheless willing 
to give "due weight" to wealth.21 Voting weight should be ac-
corded to wealth, The Federalist stated, because "[g]overnment 
is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of ... in-
dividuals."22 Even delegates who wanted to include people in de-
termining representation argued in terms of the contribution of 
people to war, rather than counting people for their own sake. 
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania argued, for example, that 
while the South would provide wealth in war, the Northern 
states would "spill their blood."23 
Some delegates favored determining votes only by popula-
tion. James Wilson of Pennsylvania consistently opposed votes 
based on property, arguing that the people were the fountain 
from which all authority is derived. "[T]he supreme power re-
sides in the people," he told the Penns.7lvania Ratification Con-
vention, "and they never part with it."2 Wilson was the best rep-
resentative of the democratic norms that prevail today, but it is 
not clear that he would have prevailed had the issue been de-
cided directly at the Convention. The Virginia Plan, which was 
offered at the beginning of the Convention and set the agenda 
for subsequent debates, provided, ambiguously, that "the rights 
of suffrage in the [ n]ational [l]egislature ought to be propor-
tioned to the quotas of contribution [i.e., by tax paid], or to the 
number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may 
seem best in different cases. "25 Madison, the primary author of 
20. Pierce Butler, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 6, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 540,542. See also Pierce Butler, Speeches to the Federal Conven-
tion (July 9, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 559, 562 ("warmly" urging the necessity of 
regarding the wealth in the determination of representation) and (July 11, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 580 (calling for counting 100% of slaves in representation of a 
state because slave in South Carolina contributed as much to wealth as a freeman in 
M assach use tts). 
21. Charles Pinckey (S.C.), Speech to the Federal Convention (July 10, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 566 (dwelling on the superior wealth of the Southern States, and 
insisted on its having its due weight in the Government); John Rutledge, Speech to the 
Federal Convention (July 11, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 582 (calling for the ad-
mission of wealth in the estimate by which representation is determined). 
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 278 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) 
(Feb. 12, 1788). 
23. Governeur Morris, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 10, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 366. 
24. James Wilson, Speech before the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Oct. 6, 
1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 433. 
25. Records of the Federal Convention (May 30, 1787) in 1 FARRAND's RECORDS 
35. 
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the Virginia Plan, ducked the great question of whether the gov-
ernment should represent people or wealth. 
The delegates who drafted the Constitution avoided the need 
to resolve whether government represented property or people 
because they could not measure property except by measuring 
people. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had been 
able to raise funds only by requisitions upon the states, and the 
Articles determined each state's quota under the requisition ac-
cording to the value of land and imRrovements within each state, 
estimated as Congress might direct. 6 Determining quotas accord-
ing to value proved unworkable because Congress had neither 
employees nor means of estimating value and because the states 
cheated. Pennsylvania, the Southern delegates complained, had 
submitted appraisals of its land that placed Pennsylvania's quota 
at half the size of Virginia's, when, the South thought, Pennsyl-
vania should have reported a quota equal to Virginia's.27 Because 
Congress was never able to ascertain the value of surveyed lands 
and improvements,28 all quotas were provisional, to be adjusted 
later. To avoid appraisals, Congress in 1783 proposed that requisi-
tions be apportioned among the states according to population, 
counting slaves at three-fifths.29 This formula was brought over 
into the Constitution to determine first votes and then taxes. The 
1783 proposal was never ratified because the Articles of Confed-
eration required unanimity for amendment and two states, New 
York and New Hampshire, refused to ratify the package.30 The 
1783 formula was considered legitimate in the constitutional de-
26. Articles of Confederation, art. VIII. March 1, 1781,19 JCC217 (1781). 
27. Report of the North Carolina Congressional Delegates to Governor Alexander 
Martin (March 24, 1783), in 20 LETTERS OF DELEGATES 90. 
28. Rufus King, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 17, 
1788) in 3 FARRAND's RECORDS 255 (saying that apportionment under the Confedera-
tion was according to surveyed lands and improvements, which Congress could never 
ascertain). 
29. The 1783 proposal provided that contributions to the congressional treasury 
shall be supplied by the states "in proportion to the whole number of white and other 
free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex and condition, including those bound to 
servitude for a term of years, and three-fifths of all other persons not comprehended in 
the foregoing description, except Indians, not paying taxes, in each State." Apri/18, 1783, 
24 JCC 260 (1783). When the language was transferred to the Constitution, art. I, § 2, the 
reference to "white and other free citizens" became simply a reference to "free citizens." 
The quoted language is otherwise the same. 
30. John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino, Editorial Note 18, in 9 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 1174. New York vetoed the 1783 proposal because it would give the federal gov-
ernment the 5% impost or tariff and would preempt the state tax that New York im-
posed on imports through New York harbor. See JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON: 
YEOMAN POLITICIAN OF THE NEW REPUBLIC 89-96 (1993). 
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bates, however, in part because it had been ratified by eleven of 
the thirteen states? 
Apportionment by population was treated in the debates as 
merely a measure of wealth when no other measure was feasible. 
As John Adams explained in 1776, "the numbers of people were 
taken ... as an index of the wealth of the state & not as subjects 
of taxation. "32 Samuel Chase, later a Justice participating in Hyl-
ton, argued that given the difficulty of land valuations, the num-
ber of inhabitants within a state was a "tolerably good criteri[on] 
of wealth."33 James Wilson, who served with Chase on the Hyl-
ton Court, reported consistently that in apportioning tax in 
Pennsylvania between Philadelphia and the west, it did not mat-
ter whether population or wealth was used.34 Consistently, Na-
thaniel Ghorum told the Convention that he had seen the tax es-
timates in Massachusetts and that it made no difference in 
allocation of state tax between Boston and the rest of the state 
whether population or property was used because "the most ex-
act proportion prevailed between numbers & property."35 James 
Madison summed up the argument by saying that although 
population was not strictly a measure of wealth, the correlation 
was sufficient. As long as labor could move with ease and free-
dom, Madison argued, labor would find its level in different 
places, so that labor would always be a measure of comparative 
wealth.36 "[T]he population and fertility in any tract of country," 
said Landholder in Connecticut, "will be proportional to each 
other."37 "If the Legislature were to be governed by wealth," 
said Roger Sherman, "they would be obliged to estimate it by 
numbers."38 "Wealth and population were the true, equitable 
31. See, e.g., James Wilson (Pa.), Speech to the Federal Convention (June 11, 1787) 
in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 201 (saying that counting slaves at three-fifths for tax had 
been adopted by all states but New Hampshire and Rhode Island); William Paterson 
(N.J.) and Rufus King (Mass.), Speeches to the Federal Convention (July 9, 1787) in 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 561-562 (accord); Rufus King, Speech to the Massachusetts Rati-
fication Convention (Jan. 17, 1788) in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 255 (accord). 
32. John Adams (Mass.), Debate in the Continental Congress, July 12, 1776, in 4 
LEITERS OF DELEGATES 439. 
33. Samuel Chase (Md.), July 12, 1776, in 4 LEITERS OF DELEGATES 438. 
34. James Wilson, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 11, 1787) in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 587-588. 
35. /d. at 587. 
36. /d. at 585-86. See also id. at 579 (George Mason's speech to the Federal Con-
vention); id. at 582 (Rufus King arguing that there was great force in the objections that 
numbers do not measure wealth, but acceding to the proposition for the sake of doing 
something). 
37. Landholder, Letter XI, CONN. COURANT (March 10, 1788), reprinted in 16 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 368. 
38. Roger Sherman, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 11, 1787) in 2 
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rule[s] of representation," William Samuel Johnson of Connecti-
cut concluded, "but ... these two principles resolved themselves 
into one; population being the best measure of wealth. "39 The 
delegates also explained at home that the formula for appor-
tionment was intended as an approximate measure of wealth.40 
The delegates did not necessarily think that population was truly 
an accurate measure of wealth, but using population to measure 
wealth avoided a deadlock over whether wealth or population 
should govern votes in principle, and they also had no other 
more accurate measure. They, accordingly, convinced them-
selves that the population was an adequate measure of wealth. 
Counting slaves at three-fifths was always a measurement of 
slaves' contribution to the wealth of the states. The controversy 
over slaves' contribution started in 1776 in the first debates over 
allocations of requisitions. The South argued that slaves should 
be excluded from population because slaves were an investment, 
like cattle or horses.41 The North argued that slaves should be 
counted in full because slaves added wealth as much as free la-
bor.42 The South countered that slaves be counted at half be-
cause that ratio reflected the relative price of free and slave la-
bor. 43 Both sides eventually compromised at three-fifths in 1783 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 582. 
39. William Samuel Johnson, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 12, 1787) in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 593. 
40. Charles Pinckney, Speech in South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan, 
1788) in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 253 (saying that we were at a loss for a rule to ascertain 
the proportionate wealth of the states and at last thought that the productive labor of the 
inhabitants was the best rule for ascertaining their wealth, counting the whole number of 
free persons plus three fifths of the slaves); Rufus King, Speech to the Massachusetts 
Ratification Convention (Jan. 17, 1788) in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 255 (explaining ap-
portionment of votes and taxes as arising because Congress could never ascertain value 
of surveyed lands and improvements); William Davie, Speech to the North Carolina 
Ratification Convention (July 24, 1788) in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 31 (representation was 
attempted from a compound ratio of wealth and population, but it was found impractica-
ble to determine the comparative value of lands and other property, in so extensive a 
territory; and population alone was adopted as the only practicable rule or criterion of 
representation; slaves were represented because their labor contributed to general 
wealth). 
41. Samuel Chase (Md.), Debate in the Continental Congress, July 12, 1776, in 4 
LETTERS OF DELEGATES 439. 
42. John Adams (Mass.), Debate in the Continental Congress, July 12, 1776, in 4 
LETTERS OF DELEGATES 439-40 (saying that ten laborers add as much wealth annually 
to the state, whether they are called freemen or slaves); James Wilson (Pa.), July 12, 
1776, in 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES 439 (saying "[d]ismiss your slaves & freemen will 
take their places"). 
43. Benjamin Harrison (Va.), July 12, 1776, in 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES 440. In 
the 1783 proposal to move from appraisals of real estate to population, the South was 
willing to count slaves at one-half. Edward Clarke (N.J.), March 27, 1783, 25 JCC 947 
(1783) (debates in the Continental Congress); Report of the North Carolina Congres-
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by reason of the necessity of abandoning the valuation-of-real-
estate system and, it was said, "by a despair on both sides" for a 
rate for slaves more favorable to their side.44 The ratio reached 
by such a hard-fought compromise in 1783 was treated as legiti-
mate in 1787. 
Population, including slaves at three-fifths, originally en-
tered the Constitution solely as a rule for allocating votes in the 
national legislature. On June 11, 1787, the Convention voted 
nine states to two in favor of apportioning votes in the national 
legislature by population, including slaves at three-fifths.45 Only 
New Jersey and Delaware voted against the proposition. These 
small states were holding out for a rule that each state should 
have equal voting power without regard to wealth or population. 
The June 11 vote was nonbinding because the Convention was 
meeting as a "Committee of the Whole" to facilitate discussion, 
but the vote displays the consensus of the Convention.46 
The apparent consensus in favor of allocating votes count-
ing slaves at three-fifths fell apart, however, on July 11, 1787. A 
committee that had met in secret reported a plan for votes with-
out explaining the principle underlying the allocation. The com-
mittee report seemed acceptable to no one. The South Carolina 
delegates, Pierce Butler and Charles Pinckey, demanded that 
slaves be counted in full in determining votes,47 and the North-
ern states countered that slaves would not be counted at all. 
Governeur Morris of Pennsylvania said that he would never 
agree to give such encouragement to the slave trade as would be 
sional Delegates to Governor Alexander Martin, March 24, 1783, in 20 LEITERS OF 
DELEGATES 90-91. 
44. Madison's Notes on Debate in the Continental Congress (April 1, 1783) in 20 
LEITERS OF DELEGATES 128. 
45. Motion in a Committee of the Whole (June 11, 1787) in 1 FARRAND'S 
RECORDS 201. 
46. See also "Report of a Grand Committee" (consisting of one delegate from each 
state and chaired by Benjamin Franklin) (July 5, 1787) in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 526 
(recommending that proportion of votes in the House of Representatives (but not tax) 
be determined by population, counting slaves at three fifths). 
47. Pierce Butler (S.C.), Speech to the Federal Convention (July 11, 1787) in 1 
FARRAND's RECORDS 580 (saying that slaves contributed as much to wealth as a free-
man and that wealth was the great means of defence and utility to the nation); Charles 
Pmckney (S.C.), Speech to the Federal Convention (July 12, 1787) in 1 FARRAND's 
RECORDS 596 (arguing that slaves were as productive of wealth as were labourers in the 
North). Pierce Butler's motion to include slaves in full in votes lost 3 states to 7 (July 11, 
1787). ld at 581. Pinckney's motion to include slaves in full in both tax and votes lost 2 
states to 8 (July 12, 1787). !d. at 596. 
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given by allowing the Southern states to gain representation for 
their slaves.48 He later explained, 
The admission of slaves into the Representation ... comes to 
this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S. C. who goes to the 
Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of 
humanity tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest 
connections & dam[ n ]s them to the most cruel bandages, shall 
[thereby] have more votes in a Govt. instituted for protection 
of the rights of mankind.49 
With the new stalemate over slavery, the motion to count slaves 
at three-fifths was defeated 4-6 on July 11, although it had 
passed overwhelmingly in June. All the Northern states except 
Connecticut voted against including slaves at three-fifths.50 All of 
the Southern states voted in favor of counting slaves at three-
fifths, except South Carolina, which apparently was holding out 
for counting slaves in full. 
2. Taxing slavery 
Apportionment of tax according to population came into 
the Constitution because it apportioned tax to the slave states 
counting slaves at three-fifths. The tax on slaves served to bridge 
the stalemate of July 11, over how to count slaves for purposes 
of representation. Counting three-fifths of the slave population 
for purposes of apportioning taxes was intended to reduce the 
South's incentive to add slaves. Once the South was taxed more 
for more slaves, the North could retreat from its stance of July 
11 and return to its position of June 11, acceding to the inclusion 
of slaves in the determination of votes. 
48. Governeur Morris, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 11, 1787) in 1 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 588. 
49. Governeur Morris, Speech to the Federal Convention (Aug. 8, 1787) in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 222. Morris' complaint came in the debate over banning the slave 
trade, after the taxation of slaves in apportionment of direct tax had been settled, indicat-
ing that his irritation at including slaves in representation had not been fully assuaged by 
his tax proposal. See also Rufus King, id at 220 (strenuously objecting to including slavery 
in representation if importation of slaves were not limited). 
50. 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 588. Madison's notes say that the count was 6 in favor, 
and 4 against, but he lists each state and tallying those states the vote is 4-6 against and 
context makes clear the motion failed. 
Connecticut delegates seem to have been the most tolerant of slavery in the North, 
for reasons idiosyncratic to the delegates. See Oliver Ellsworth (Conn.), Aug. 22, 1787, 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 371 (North should not intermeddle in slavery); Roger Sherman 
(Conn.), id., at 369-379 (urging that the Convention should "leave the matter [of slavery] 
as we find it" and "despatch [to our] business"). 
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At the start of the debates on July 12, Governor Morris 
moved that taxes as well as votes in the national legislature be 
allocated according to population, including slaves at three-
fifths? Morris's motion to include slaves for taxes met his own 
objection the day before that including slaves for votes would 
encourage enslavement of Africans. Counting slaves for repre-
sentation would make it in the interest of the South to continue 
the infamous traffic in slaves, Luther Martin would later explain, 
whereas apportioning tax by slaves would discourage slavery.52 
The North was asking for only a public relations ploy to get back 
to its June 11 position. The North would take less umbrage at 
counting slaves for representation, said Wilson of Pennsylvania, 
if the rule could be presented strategically first as rule of taxa-
tion and only indirectly as a rule on voting. 53 
Morris's initial motion would have made all taxes subject to 
apportionment by population, counting slaves at three-fifths. 
George Mason of Virginia objected that apportioning all taxes 
would drive Congress to requisitions, and James Wilson objected 
that he could not understand how apportionment could be per-
formed unless restricted to direct taxation.54 In Wilson's mind, 
direct taxes were those that could feasibly be apportioned. Mor-
ris responded by amending his motion so that apportionment 
would be required only for direct tax.55 Apportionment of tax 
changed enough votes in the North, so that by the end of the 
day, apportionment of both direct taxes and votes in the national 
legislature by population with slaves counted at three-fifths 
passed by a margin of 6-2 with two other states divided. 56 
51. 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS at 591-592. 
52. Luther Martin, "Genuine Information," Maryland Legislature (Nov. 29, 1787) 
in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 197. 
53. James Wilson, July 12, 1787, 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 595. See also Gouverneur 
Morris, Speech to the Federal Convention (Sept. 13, 1788) in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 
608 (saying that apportionment of direct tax was adopted in order allow Negroes to be 
re-ferred to as the objects of direct tax, and only incidentally to be counted in representa-
tion). 
54. James Wilson, Speech to the Federal Convention, July 12, 1787, 1 FARRAND'S 
RECORDS 592. 
55. /d. at 592-93. 
56. /d. at 597. Voting yes were Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina and Georgia. New Jersey and Delaware, the only no's, were still holding 
out for equal voting per state, which was not finally settled until the Senate was settled at 
2 votes per state on July 23. 2 FARRAND's RECORDS at 95. In the North, Pennsylvania 
(Morris' and Wilson's state) changed from no to yes from July 11 to July 12, once slaves 
were taxed. Massachusetts changed from no to divided. New Hampshire, Rhode Island 
and New York in the north were absent. 
In the South, Maryland moved from no to yes. Charles Carrol of Maryland had ap-
parently voted no on July 11, just so as to allow better phrasing that would not give urn-
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Rufus King of Massachusetts later complained that the 
North had reluctantly acquiesced in the inequity of counting 
slaves for representation in the House only under the erroneous 
assumption that the federal government would rely on direct 
taxes. Had it been foreseen that federal revenue would come to 
the extent it did from unapportionable indirect taxes, King com-
plained, then the states without slaves would never have allowed 
slaves to be included in the determination of votes in the 
House.57 King overstated the case: taxation by slaves was at best 
a modest bargaining chip. In the Committee of the Whole on 
June 11, the North had voted to count slaves at three-fifths for 
purposes of legislative apportionment without allocation of any 
tax to slaves. The North did not need very much to convince it-
self again to acquiesce in counting slaves for purposes of legisla-
tive apportionment. All that was needed was enough tax on 
slaves to get over a short-term Northern objection. The North 
probably knew it was not getting much value from the bargain, 
because it was widely argued, most vigorously by Governeur 
Morris himself, that direct taxes with apportionment would be 
too cumbersome to collect and would be studiously avoided.58 
Moreover, the bargain also relied on apportionment of "direct 
tax," and, "direct tax" was a mutating term at the time, contract-
ing so that it applied only to taxes that could be apportioned. 
Since only "direct taxes" had to be apportioned to slaves, non-
slave states could not expect to shift much of the tax burden to 
the South. King was wrong to complain that that there never had 
brage to the North. 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 588 note. Luther Martin of Maryland 
seemed to have moved to yes for anti-slavery reasons because the tax would discourage 
slavery, whereas including slaves in voting would have just encouraged that "infamous 
slave trade." Luther Martin, "Genuine Information" presented to the Maryland Legisla-
ture, (Nov. 29, 1787) in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 197. South Carolina moved from no to 
divided, apparently because one delegate held out for counting slaves in full in represen-
tation and one acceded to counting slaves only at three-fifths. 
South Carolina moved from no to divided, apparently because one delegate held out 
for counting slaves in full for voting and one acceded to counting slaves only at three-
fifths. 
57. Letter of Rufus King to Colonel Pickering (?), Nov. 4, 1803, in 3 FARRAND'S 
RECORRDS 399; Rufus King, Speech to the U.S. Senate, March 1819 (?)in 3 FARRAND'S 
RECORDS 429-430. 
58. See, e.g., James Madison, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 11, 1787) in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 585 (Madison's notes) (suggesting that all delegates understood 
that future revenues would be principally from imports and exports); Governeur Morris, 
Speech to the Federal Convention (Aug. 16, 1787) in id. at 307 (saying that that the peo-
ple of America would not have the money to pay direct taxes: "Seize and sell their effects 
and you push them into revolt"); Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratifica-
tion Convention, (June 27, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 351 (saying that imposts may 
increase to such a degree as to render direct taxes unnecessary). 
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been apportioned taxes reaching slaves. The apparent bargain 
was not that Congress was supposed to impose apportioned 
taxes, but only that if it did impose an apportioned tax, it needed 
to count slaves at three-fifths. 
In 1820 Charles Pinckney of South Carolina dismissed 
Northern complaints that direct taxes had not raised as much as 
expected, since fully productive slaves should have been counted 
at 100% for purposes of representation anyway. Pinckney was 
appealing to principles that would have been accepted in 1787: 
that votes should follow wealth and that slaves contributed to 
wealth.59 The only controversial aspect of Pinckney's 1820 com-
ment was his claim to count slaves at 100%. The accepted com-
promise was to fix slaves' contribution to wealth at three-fifths. 
Pinckney seems right, however, that the tax disincentive did not 
have to be meaningful because the consensus of the Convention 
was that votes followed wealth. 
Charles Bullock argued in 1900 that apportionment of di-
rect taxes "originated in the struggle to effect a compromise 
on the question of representation for the slaves. "60 "It had no 
basis in any rational scheme for regulating taxation, and could 
have had none. "61 That description captures the original mean-
ing of apportionment of tax. 
B. NO VETO INTENDED 
The historical context shows that apportionment was never 
intended as a restraint or veto on direct tax. 
1. The Ordinariness of Apportionment 
Removing the Southern incentive to import slaves was the 
proximate cause of the decision to require the apportionment of 
direct taxes, but the adoption of that requirement occurred in a 
context in which apportionment of tax was an ordinary rule. Un-
der the Articles of Confederation, Congress had no tax power 
and had to raise all its revenue by assigning each state a quota to 
59. See infra note 190. 
60. Charles 1. Bullock, The Origin, Purpose and Effect of the Direct-Tax Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. 1/., 15 POL. SCI. Q. 452,452 (1900). 
61. !d.; see also EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE 
HISTORY, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 555 
(2ded. 1914) ("[I]t is dear that it was due simply and solely to the attempt to solve the 
difficulty connected wnh the maintenance of slavery."). 
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be raised by the state under its own tax system.62 The requisition 
system was about to disappear, but the Founders assumed that 
the status quo of requisitions would continue.63 In a meaningful 
sense, apportionment by state was just a continuation of earlier 
requisitions upon states, except that the tax would be collected 
by federal officials and the objects of tax would be set at the fed-
eral level. 
Apportionment by some formula or other was originally in-
evitable because there was no other way to collect men or arms 
for the war for independence. Allocation of requisition among 
states arose when Congress was just a revolutionary, even illegal, 
assembly of delegates without any employees. Population, in-
cluding slaves at three-fifths, was a formula for allocating requi-
sitions or tax revenues when Congress proposed it in 1783.64 
When the 1783 formula entered the Constitutional debates as a 
method for allocating votes in Congress, using population and 
the three-fifths ratio for taxes as well would have been a natural 
reflex because it was a familiar system for requisitions. In the 
1895 case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,65 the Su-
preme Court called apportionment "one of the bulwarks of pri-
vate rights and private property."66 That would have sounded 
strange to the Founders because apportionment was not a bul-
wark of anything, but just an ordinary way to collect taxes. 
2. Direct Tax Considered "Unrestricted" by Both Sides 
The most hard-fought issue of the ratification debate was 
over whether the federal government would have the power to 
lay direct or internal taxes. Neither side of those debates, how-
62. Articles of Confederation, art. VIII. March 1, 1781, 19 JCC 217 (1781). 
63. A Freeman Ill [Tench Coxe], To the Minority of the Convention of Pennsyl-
vania, PENNSYLVANIA GAZETIE (Philadelphia) (Feb. 6, 1788), reprinted in 16 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 49, 51 (saying that if the if states raise their quotas of a requi-
sition by themselves in the most expeditious way, a federal government with the least 
degree of reason or virtue would not interfere); James HcHenry, Debate in the Maryland 
House of Representatives (Nov. 29, 1787), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 149 (arguing that 
Congress would not exercise its power over direct taxes if the respective states would 
raise their quotas in any other manner more suitable to their own inclinations); Letter 
from Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to Samuel Huntington, Governor of Con-
necticut (Sept. 26, 1787) in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 470,471 (saying that Congress's 
authority over direct tax need not be exercised if each state will furnish its quota); THE 
FEDERALIST No. 45, at 312-3 (James Madison) (Jan. 26, 1788) (Congress would probably 
allow states to supply their quotas by their own collections). 
64. Debates in the Continental Congress (April 18, 1783) in 24 JCC 260 (April 18, 
1783). 
65. 157 u.s. 429 (1895). 
66. 1d. at 583. 
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ever, saw apportionment as a restraint on direct taxes. Notwith-
standing the apportionment requirement, both sides said that the 
proposed Constitution would give Congress unrestricted power 
to lay direct taxes, for better or worse. 
In the ratification conventions, the Anti-Federalists pro-
posed an amendment that would have denied the federal gov-
ernment the power to lay a direct tax in a state that was willing 
to pay its requisition quota. Seven of the thirteen states endorsed 
the recommendation for restrictions on direct tax as they ratified 
the Constitution.67 Only two states rejected the recommenda-
tion.68 The Anti-Federalists generall~ conceded that Congress 
might be allowed to lay the impost. 9 Imposts were taxes that 
could be collected without interfering with the internal police of 
the states.70 Denying Congress the power to lay direct or internal 
taxes, however, was "the point most dear to the opposition"71 
and "the chief object of (Anti-Federalist] persuit."72 Anti-
Federalist opposition, Madison told Washington, was reducible 
"to a single point, the power of direct taxation. "73 The Anti-
Federalists argued that giving the federal government the power 
to impose direct taxes changed the system of government from a 
confederation of states into a consolidated, single government. 
Giving the federal government the power to lay direct taxes, 
Anti-Federalist George Mason argued, is "calculated to annihi-
67. The states that recommended amendment denying the Federal government the 
power to lay direct taxes if the state paid its quota of a requisition are (1) Massachusetts 
(February 7, 1788), 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 322, 323; (2) South Carolina (May 23, 1788), 1 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 325; (3) New Hampshire (June 21, 1788), 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 325, 
326; (4) Virginia (June 27,1788),10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1550,1556; (5) New York 
(July 26, 1788), 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 327, 329; (6) North Carolina (August 1, 1788), 4 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 245; and (7) Rhode Island (May 29, 1790), 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 336. 
68. The rejecting states were Pennsylvania (2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 624) and 
Maryland. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 553. 
69. See, e.g., An Old Whig, Letter VI, PHILADELPHIA lNDEP. GAZETTEER (Nov. 24, 
1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 218 (arguing that the true line between 
the powers of Congress and the several states is between internal and external taxes); 
Letter from Brutus V to the People of the State of New York, N.Y.J. (Dec. 13, 1787), re-
printed in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 427 (conceding that the new federal government 
might be given the authority to lay the impost because smuggling and concern for the 
merchants would keep tax rates low). 
70. Oliver Ellsworth, Debate in the Connecticut Ratification Convention (Jan. 7, 
1788), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 549-50. 
71. Letter of Tench Coxe to James Madison (July 23, 1788), in 11 MADISON 
PAPERS 194. 
72. Letter of Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Dec. 5, 1789), in 12 MADISON 
PAPERS 460. 
73. Letter of James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 12 MADISON 
PAPERS at 459. 
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late totally the State Governments."74 To render the Congress 
"safe and proper," Anti-Federalist James Monroe progosed to 
"take from it one power only": "that of direct taxation." 5 
The Anti-Federalists did not understand that the appor-
tionment was a killer requirement because they stated that direct 
taxation was (unfortunately) available to Congress without re-
striction under the Constitution unless their amendment was 
passed.76 The hard-fought debate over direct taxation involved 
taxes that the document subjected to apportionment. The Anti-
Federalists neither saw apportionment as restricting nor em-
braced it as responsive to their objections. 
The proponents of the Constitution also described the 
power of direct taxation as unrestricted, but they argued that 
Congress would need the power, especially during war. Article I, 
section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress what seems to be a 
plenary power to tax "to provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare. "77 During the New York ratification conven-
tion Hamilton advocated an unlimited federal power to levy di-
rect taxes: 
A constitution cannot set bounds to a nation's wants; it ought 
not, therefore, to set bounds to its resources. Unexpected in-
vasions, long and ruinous wars, may demand all the possible 
abilities of the country. Shall not your government have 
power to call these abilities into action? The contingencies of 
society are not reducible to calculations. They cannot be fixed 
or bounded, even in imagination.78 
Oliver Ellsworth told Connecticut that war was increasingly a 
matter settled by the purse and not the sword: a government that 
could command only a fraction of the nation's resources for was 
74. George Mason, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 4, 1788) 
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 29. 
75. James Monroe, Debates in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 10, 1788) 
in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1109. See also" Address of Seceding Assemblymen to the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly" (Philadelphia, Oct. 2, 1787) in 13 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 296-297 (saying that had the convention left the exercise of internal taxation to 
the separate states, there would be no objection to the plan of government). 
76. Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention, (June 5, 1788) 
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 51( saying "The clause before you gives a power of direct taxa-
tion, unbounded and unlimited"); John Lansing, Speech to the New York Ratification 
Convention (June 28, 1788) in ELLIOT's DEBATES 371 (opposing Article I,§ 8, clause 1 
because it "confers a right of ... laying direct taxes without restriction"). 
77. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1. 
78. Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratification Convention (June 
27, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 351. 
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"like a man with but one arm to defend [him]self."79 In time of 
war, an enemy with a powerful navy eliminates revenue from the 
imposts with an effective blockade. "Strike out direct taxation 
from the list of federal authorities," said Madison, and Virginia 
will be open to "surprize and devastation whenever an enemy 
powerful at Sea chuses to invade her."80 More generally, the first 
purpose of the Constitution was to solve a federal fiscal crisis 
and to allow the federal government to pay Revolutionary War 
debts. When war came again, as the Founders expected, the fed-
eral government would have to borrow again. 81 
George Washington told Thomas Jefferson that he would 
embrace any tolerable compromise in the fight over ratification 
and would not object much to any of the amendments the Anti-
Federalists suggested except their proposal to prevent direct 
taxation.82 Washington thought the direct tax restriction was the 
amendment that the Anti-Federalists were demanding most 
strenuously.83 Washington's stubborn defense of direct taxation 
represented the Founders' intent. 
79. Oliver Ellsworth, Speech to the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 2 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 191. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 175 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(January 8, 1788) (acknowledging aversion "to every project that is calculated to disarm 
the government of a single weapon which ... might be usefully employed for general de-
fence and security."); THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 149-150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jan. 1, 
1788) (arguing that since federal government had unlimited responsibilities in time of 
war or domestic unrest, it must be granted unlimited power to fund satisfaction of its re-
sponsibilities even in ordinary times). 
80. Letter from James Madison to George Thomas (Jan. 29, 1789), in 2 THE FIRST 
FEDERAL ELECfiON, 1788-1790, at 344 (Gordon DenBover, ed. 1984). Accord, Elisha 
Porter, in DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF MASSACHUSETTS, HELD IN THE YEAR 1788 319 (Brandford K. Pierce & Charles 
Hale, eds. 1856) (saying that "to grant only an impost is to invite our enemies to attack 
us, for shuting our ports is to destroy us."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George 
Washington (Nov. 4, 1787), in 14 JEFFERSON PAPERS 328 (saying that "[c]alculation has 
convinced me that circumstances may arise and probably will arise, wherein all the re-
sources of taxation will be necessary for the safety of the state"). 
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 146-47 (Alexander Hamilton) (saying that public 
credit is essential to public safety); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison 
(May 2, 1788), in 13 JEFFERSON PAPERS 129-130 (saying that good credit is indispensable 
to the present system of carrying on war, and that "[t] he existence of a nation having not 
credit is always precarious"); Letter of Roger Sherman to William Floyd (date un-
known), in 3 DoCUMENTARY HISTORY 353 ("Our credit as a nation is sinking" and "the 
resources of the country could not be drawn out to defend against a foreign invasion"); 
Republican VI, CONN. COURANT (MARCH 19, 1787), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: MICROFICHE SUPPL. CONN. 
(saying that it would be strange if Britain or Spain did not force us into war in the next 
10-15 years). 
82. Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (August 31, 1788) in 30 
WASHINGTON WRITINGS 82-83. 
83. /d. 
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In the end, the Federalists defeated the Anti-Federalist 
amendment restraining federal direct tax in the first Congress 
when the Bill of Rights was debated.84 Given that a majority of 
states had endorsed the restriction, the proposed restraint on the 
federal direct tax came close to adoption. Since the Federalist 
proponents of the Constitution won the battle to allow what 
both sides called an unrestricted federal power to lay direct tax, 
however, allowing apportionment to cripple direct taxation 
would reverse the victory that the Federalists in fact achieved. 
The strenuous debate is also good evidence that that apportion-
ment was not viewed as a restraint or veto of any federal tax. No 
important player at the time knew or understood apportion-
ment's potential absurdity. 
C. THE 1787 DICTIONARY MEANING OF "DIRECf TAX" 
1. "Direct Tax" Meant "Apportioned Tax" 
Dictionaries were constructed in 1787, as they are now, 
through a broad sampling of word usage.85 In a well-constructed 
dictionary at the time of the Constitution, "direct tax" would 
have been a synonym for apportioned tax, including state taxes 
used to satisfy a requisition quota that had been apportioned to 
a state. The definition of "direct tax" came from the process of 
apportionment. If the term referred to specific taxes, it was only 
because those taxes were typically apportioned. As particular 
taxes ceased to be apportioned or apportionable, they ceased to 
be direct. 
The original meaning of direct tax referred to all state taxes 
except the impost. In 1783, Congress proposed that it be given 
the power to enact a 5% "impost," or tax on imports. It pro-
posed a separate $1.5 million requisition apportioned to each 
state by population. The term "direct tax" referred to the requi-
sition part of the proposal, but not to the impost.86 Before the 
84. 1 ANNALS 431-42, 660-65, 773-77 (reporting the 39-9 defeat of a proposal to 
prohibit direct taxation if states paid their requisition quota requisition). 
85. Compare Samuel Johnson, Preface to the DICfiONARY (1755) (saying that the 
sense of a word "may easily be collected entire from the examples"), quoted in Harold 
Whitehall, The Eng/ish Language, in WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICfiONARY OF THE 
AMERICAN LANGUAGE xxxiv (College ed. 1957) with The English Language, in 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICfiONARY 28a-29a (10th ed. 1993) (describing 
the current lexicographical practice of using a collection of citations to ascertain meaning 
and changes in meaning). 
86. See, e.g., Letter of Eliphalet Dyer to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr. (March 18, 1783) in 
20 LETTERS OF DELEGATES 44-45 (asking how war debts can be satisfied "by direct taxes 
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Constitution, a state could use any tax to satisfy its requisitions. 
Any state tax, except for the proposed impost, could thus be a 
"direct tax." In the ratification debates, "direct tax" referred to 
state taxes that would be used to satisfy a state's quota. 87 In 1796 
Oliver Wolcott, Hamilton's successor as Secretary of the Treas-
ury, prepared an inventory of "direct taxes" for the purpose of 
helping Congress enact an apportioned tax. Wolcott's inventor1 
consisted simply of a list of the taxes used by the various states.8 
The original distinction between "direct tax" and "impost" 
became the crucial distinction in the most important fight in the 
ratification process: whether the federal government would be 
able to lay direct or internal taxes in a state that was willing to 
pay its requisition quota. Within those debates, "direct tax" was 
a synonym for internal taxes, and "indirect tax" was a synonym 
for the "impost" or tax on imports.89 "Dry taxes" were "direct 
taxes."90 The leading Anti-Federalist spokesmen, including 
Brutus,91 Federal Farmer,92 and Minority of the Pennsylvania 
on each state, justly proportioned, when the People have been so harrassed with taxes & 
Collectors, [whereas] dutys or Impost on foreign trade or Importation [are] paid by the 
Mercht in the first Instance and then it must take its Chance"); Letter of Samuel Whar-
ton to John Cook (Jan. 6, 1783) in 19 LEITERS OF DELEGATES 552 (saying that with the 
failure of the 1781 federal impost proposal, the states will need to restore federal credit 
by "the irksome Task of laying immediate, and direct Taxes upon their Citizens."); Alex-
ander Hamilton, Speech to New York Assembly (Feb 18, 1787) reported in 1 THE 
COLUMBIAN MAGAZINE 514 (June 1787) ("If we do not employ the impost, we must find 
others in direct taxation"). 
87. John Marshall, Debates in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 10, 1788), 
9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1122. See also Oliver Wolcott, Jr., Direct Taxes, H.R. DOC. 
NO. 100-4 (1796), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLASS III FINANCE 431, (Walter Low-
rie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Gales & Seaton 1832) (describing Virginia taxes as 
collected, first by requiring county commissioners to ascertain the value of property 
within their county and, secondly, with taxes at fixed rates on various items including: 
salaries, interest, annuities, slaves, horses, carriages, mules). 
88. /d. at 414 
89. See, e.g., George Nicolas, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 
6, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES 98 (touting the Constitution's allowing federal imposts, 
which would reduce direct taxes); Connecticutensis, To the People of Connecticut (1787), 
reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 512-13 (describing "indirect taxation" as "duties 
laid upon those foreign articles which are imported and sold among us"). 
90. Amos Singletary, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 
25, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 101 ("They tell us Congress won't lay dry taxes upon 
us, but collect all the money they want by impost"). 
91. Letter from Brutus V to the People of the State of New York (Nov. 27, 1787), 
N.Y. J., (Dec. 13, 1787), reprimed in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 427 (conceding that 
the new federal government might be given the authority to lay the impost because 
smuggling and concern for the merchants would keep tax rates low, but contesting fed-
eral power over direct taxes, such as "excises, duties on written instruments, on every 
thmg we eat, dnnk, or wear") (emphasis added). 
92. Federal Farmer, Letter Ill (Oct. 10, 1787) in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 35-36 
(asking whether it was wise to vest internal taxes, such as poll, land, excises and duties in 
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Convention,93 used "direct tax" as a term that included all inter-
nal taxes, but not the impost. The leading Federalist spokesmen, 
including James Madison,94 James Wilson,95 and Alexander 
Hamilton,96 did too. Jefferson, who wavered on the Constitution, 
also used "direct" and "internal" tax as synonyms.97 
The definition of "direct tax" had to contract with the adop-
tion of the Constitution, however, because some taxes ceased to 
be apportionable. An excise tax, for example, would have been a 
direct tax under the requisition system because it was not an im-
post. An excise was an internal or dry land tax and it could have 
been a source of revenue for the federal government only as 
used by the states to satisfy apportioned requisitions. "Excises" 
were commonly treated as "direct taxes" in the debates.98 The 
Constitution, however, requires that "excises" be uniform across 
the states.99 It also requires that "direct taxes" be apportioned 
the federal government, and saying that external tax, that is, the impost duty on imported 
goods, was different). 
93. "The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the 
State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents" (Dec. 18, 1787) in 15 DoCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 30-31 (saying that the power of direct taxation will further apply to every indi-
vidual as congress may tax land, cattle, trades, occupations, & to any amount, and every 
object of internal taxation); An Old Whig, Letter VI, PHILADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETTEER 
(Nov. 24, 1787) in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 218 (arguing that the true line between 
the powers of Congress and the several states is between internal and external taxes). 
94. James Madison, Debates in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 11, 
1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1146 (saying that the Southern States will bear 
more of the impost because they import more, but the inequality will be lessened if Con-
gress could also impose "direct taxes"). 
95. James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard, Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in 
13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 342-43 (stating that although imposts would probably be 
sufficient, Congress needs the power of direct taxes within reach in cases of emergency, 
and that there is no greater reason to fear a direct tax than an impost). 
96. Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratification Convention (June 
27, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 351 ("Possibly, in the advancement of commerce, the 
imposts may increase to such a degree as to render direct taxes unnecessary."). 
97. See e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 21, 1787), in 8 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 253 n.1 ("Would it not have been better to assign to Congress 
exclusively the article of imposts for federal purposes, [and] to have left direct taxation 
exclusively to the states?"); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael (Dec. 
25, 1788), in 14 JEFFERSON PAPERS 385 ("Many of the opposition wish to take from 
Congress the power of internal taxation.") (emphasis added). 
98. See supra note 91. See also Cato Utensis, VA. INDEPENDENT CHRON. (Oct. 17, 
17878), reprinted in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 75 (saying that nobody but the Virginia 
legislature should have the power of direct taxation, "if it should ever be found necessary 
to curse this land with hateful excisemen") (emphasis added); The Impartial Examiner I, 
VIRGINIA INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (March 25, 1788) in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
462 ("Consider the [injuries] to which this country may be subjected by excise law, --by 
direct taxation of every kind."). 
99. U.S. CONST. art I,§ 8, cl. 1 (providing that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall 
be uniform throughout the United States"). 
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among the states. 100 It is impossible to apportion a tax among 
states according to population while keeping the rate the same. 
It follows that a tax for which the rate must be uniform cannot 
be a direct tax. Accordingly, the use of "direct tax" changed dur-
ing the ratification period to exclude "excise taxes." The debates 
include a good number of references in which "excise tax" is ex-
cluded from the definition of "direct tax." 101 The New York rati-
fication convention, for example, recommended a constitutional 
amendment to prohibit federal direct taxes. In a separate para-
graph, that convention also recommended a prohibition on ex-
cise taxes. 102 New York's separate listing of excises tells us the 
drafters did not think of excises as unambiguously covered by 
"direct taxes." Resolutions in Massachusetts, South Carolina, 
and Rhode Island would have prohibited Congress from laying 
direct taxes unless revenues from imposts and excises were insuf-
ficient.103 Those resolutions also treated excises as not "direct 
tax." There seem to be more references to direct taxes including 
excises than to direct taxes excluding excises, but those refer-
ences occurred before the debaters realized that excises could 
not be apportioned. 
Similarly the stamp tax on legal documents was a "direct 
tax" before the Constitution, but ceased to be a "direct tax" once 
it was clear that it could not be apportioned. One of the crises 
100. U.S. CONST. art I,§ 2, cl. 3 (providing that "[r]epresentatives and direct Taxes 
shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, 
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by added to the whole 
Number of free Persons, ... three-fifths of all other Persons"); U.S. CONST. § 9, cl. 4 
(providing that "[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to 
the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken"). 
101. Benjamin Gale, Speech Before Killingworth Town Meeting in Connecticut 
(Nov. 12, 1787), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 424 (arguing that they will not only tax 
"by duties, impost, and excise but to levy direct taxes upon you"); Robert Dawes, Speech 
to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 18, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES 42 
(arguing that it is easier for Congress to resort to impost or excises than to tax wholly by 
direct taxes); Francis Dana, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 
18, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 42 (arguing that Congress would not levy direct taxes 
unless imposts and excises were insufficient); Robert Livingston, Speech to the New 
York Ratification Convention (June 27, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 344 (arguing that 
Congress may need direct taxes because imposts and excises would not be enough); 
Samuel Spencer, Debate in the North Carolina Ratification Convention (July 26,1788) in 
4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 76 (arguing that Congress might be allowed to lay imposts and ex-
cises, but not direct taxes). 
102. The Debates in the Convention of the State of New York, 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 
329. 
103. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 322-23 (Massachusetts recommendation that "Congress 
do not lay direct taxes but when the moneys arising from the impost and excise are insuf-
ficient"); id. at 325 (recommendation adopted in South Carolina); id at 335 (recommen· 
dation adopted in Rhode Island). 
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leading to the Revolutionary War was the British imposition of a 
stamp tax. Madison described the British stamp tax as "an inter-
nal and direct tax, [which] produced a radical examination of the 
subject. "104 Under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, how-
ever, a stamp tax has to be uniform among the states,105 and that 
prevents apportionment. The stamp tax hence ceased to be a 
"direct tax" when the Constitution came into effect. Once it was 
realized that a tax could not be apportioned, then that tax could 
not be "direct" because apportionment was the defining charac-
teristic of "direct tax." Any tax that was not apportioned could 
not be a direct tax. 
In the congressional debate in 1794 over a proposed federal 
tax on carriages, Theodore Sedgewick of Massachusetts said that 
any tax that could not be apportioned was not direct. Sedgewick 
argued that Congress was authorized to tax every subject and 
that pleasure carriages were luxuries which could properly be 
taxed. Since a tax on carriages could not be allocated "by the 
constitutional ratio" -i.e., counting slaves at three-fifths- the 
tax was not "direct" within the sense of that word used in the 
Constitution. 106 Apportionment was the defining characteristic 
of a direct tax. 
Some English words, including "direct tax," express conclu-
sions. For example, I might ask my wife, "Is this trash?" She 
might reply, "No, Dear, seal it up and take to the attic," or "Yes, 
Dear, please take it out to the curb." I do not have to know the 
contents to know whether the box is "trash," as long as I know 
what to do with it. "Trash" is defined by what we are going to do 
with it. Once the conclusion or process is attached to a word, it 
typically acquires some characteristics. Things that are going to 
be thrown away have some traits that distinguish them from 
things that will be saved. 
Conclusion or process words are common in English. If you 
are a "target," "prey," "victim," or "bait," then someone is after 
you, whatever your other traits. "Distractions," "detours," and 
104. Letter from James Madison to Jos. C. Cabell (Sept. 18, 1828), in 4 ELLIOT's 
DEBATES 600; see Bernard Bailyn, General Introduction to 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750-1765, at 124-127 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965) (describing 
arguments by Benjamin Franklin and others that Parliament might be allowed to lay ex-
ternal taxes or customs duties even without representation, but could not impose internal 
taxes such as stamp taxes on the colonies). 
105. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1. The "duties" in clause 1 was apparently a reference 
to the stamp tax. See supra note 16. 
106. Theodore Sedgewick (Mass.), Debate in the U.S. House of Representatives 
(May 6, 1794), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 433. 
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"feints" are not the main route, although I might be able to tell 
whether an attack is a feint or the main thrust only after I see how 
successful it has been. The accounting terms "asset," "deferred 
expense," and "basis" say that cost will be taken into account in 
future earnings, but not this year. The defining aspect of the word 
is the conclusion, and any other characteristics are derived from 
that conclusion. "Direct tax" was like that in 1787. An item ceases 
to be "trash" when the decision is made to keep it. Similarly, a tax 
ceases to be a "direct tax" when it ceases to be apportioned. 
2. A voidable Taxes? 
Professor Erik Jensen has argued that all indirect taxes are 
like sales taxes, imposed on the seller of a good, but usually in-
cluded in the price of the good and passed on to buyers. Buyers 
can avoid indirect taxes, he argues, by not buying the good. Ac-
cording to Professor Jensen, the buyer's ability to avoid a tax 
provides protection against oppressive tax rates. If a tax can not 
be avoided by buyer choice, then he would treat the tax as a di-
rect tax which would have to be apportioned. 107 I argue later that 
apportionment does not serve the function seeks. For now, I ar-
gue that the pass-on and buyer-choice traits do not define indi-
rect taxes. The buyer-choice argument was used primarily to jus-
tify the impost during the constitutional debates. The argument 
does not describe all indirect taxes. 
It was commonly argued in the constitutional period that 
the impost was a better tax than direct or internal taxes because 
the impost could be collected by importing merchants and would 
be passed on to willing buyers. An importing merchant would 
have cash with which to pay an impost when he sold the im-
ported goods. Taxes on land, by contrast, required payment by 
an owner who might have no cash. The importer-merchant, 
moreover, would ordinarily be able to add the impost to the sale 
price of his goods. 108 "The price of the commodity is blended · 
107. Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes 
Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334,2395,2405-07 (1997). 
108. See, e.g., Letter of Eliphalet Dyer (Conn. Delegate to Congress) to Jonathan 
Trumbull, Sr. (Apr. 3, 1783), in 20 LEITERS OF DELEGATES 139 (rguing that an impost is 
better than dry or direct taxes because the impost is paid by the importing merchants 
who have cash and who will pass on the tax only to willing buyers; also arguing that the 
impost avoided "the disagreeable force of a (tax] Collector"); Letter of Eliphalet Dyer to 
Jonathan Trumbull, Sr. (Mar. 18, 1783), in 20 LEITERS OF DELEGATES 45 (arguing that 
an apportioned direct tax will harass the people, whereas the impost is paid "by the Mer-
chant in the first Instance, & then it must take its Chance"); Governeur Morris, Speech 
to the Federal Convention (Aug. 16, 1787) in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 307 (arguing that 
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with the tax," Wilson told Penns.fivania, "and the person is often 
not sensible of the payment." 10 A federal impost would allow 
the reduction of direct taxes. 110 
The Federalists used the pass-on argument to try to convince 
states with good deep-water harbors to support federal impost 
proposals. Rhode Island, for example, vetoed Congress's 1781 
proposal for a 5% federal impost to help pay war debts. Congress 
tried to get Rhode Island to change its mind by telling the mer-
chants of Rhode Island that the impost could be incorporated into 
the price of the commodity so that it would be ultimately borne by 
the consumer. 111 Similarly, New York vetoed Congress's 1783 
proposal for a federal impost. In Federalist No. 35, Hamilton tried 
to convince the merchant importers of New York to let the fed-
eral government impose a federal impost on goods through New 
York harbor. Hamilton argued that the conditions of trade would 
usually allow the merchants to add the impost to the price of the 
goods and pass it on to the ultimate purchasers. 112 
When the impost was included in the price of the imported 
good, it was argued, the impost was paid by choice. An impost 
blended in the price is the easiest and most just mode of taxation, 
James Wilson told the Pennsylvania convention, because it is vol-
untary: "No man is obliged to consume more than he pleases, and 
each buys in proportion only to his consumption." 113 With the tax 
included in the price of the good, Hamilton argued, "the amount 
to be contributed by each citizen will in a degree be at his own op-
tion, and can be regulated by an attention to his resources." 114 
If the impost did suppress consumption of imported goods, 
the framers of the Constitution would have liked that result. In 
those mercantilist times, imports were said to lead inevitably to 
the people of America will not have cash to pay direct taxes). 
109. James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 4, 
1787) in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 467. 
110. George Nicolas, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 6, 1788) 
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 98; Letter of Samuel Wharton to John Cook (Jan. 6, 1783) in 19 
LETTERS OF DELEGATES 552 (saying that with the failure of the 1781 federal impost pro-
posal, the states will need to restore federal credit by "the irksome Task of laying imme-
diate, and direct Taxes upon their Citizens."); Alexander Hamilton, Speech to New York 
Assembly (Feb. 18, 1787) reported in 1 THE COLUMBIAN MAGAZINE 514 (June 1787) 
("If we do not employ the impost, we must find others in direct taxation"). 
111. Committee of Congress consisting of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and 
Thomas Fitzsimmons, "Reply to the Rhode Island Objections Touching Import Duties" 
(1782) in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 100. 
112. THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 164-65 (Alexander Hamilton). 
113. James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 4, 
1787) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 467. 
114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 102 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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"luxurl, effeminacy, and corruption" 115 and to wanton consump-
tion." Imports drained the country of precious specie. 117 Madi-
son hoped that a high impost would disrupt the traditional de-
pendence of Virginia upon trade with the British.118 An 
anonymous New Yorker argued that New York should prohibit 
importation of all "foreign articles that might be made [ domesti-
cally] and levying heavy duties on all imported luxuries." 119 
Buyer choice moderated the rates of the impost because 
buyers would reduce government revenue if the government 
tried to raise rates too high. Hamilton argued in Federalist 21 
that indirect taxes on consumption by their nature carry safe-
guards against excess rates: 
[Taxes on articles of consumption] prescribe their own limit; 
which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end pro-
posed, that is, an extension of the revenue .... If duties are 
too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is 
eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when 
they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. This 
forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of 
the citizens by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural limita-
tion of the power of imposing them. 120 
Anti-Federalist Brutus made the same argument. Brutus 
conceded that the federal government might be granted the im-
post, because if federal taxes are "laid higher than trade will 
bear, the merchants will cease importing, or smuggle their 
goods."121 "We have therefore sufficient security," Brutus con-
cluded, "arising from the nature of the thing, against burden-
some, and intolerable impositions from this kind of tax." 122 
Brutus would not, however, concede to the federal government 
115. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to James Warren (Oct. 7, 1785), in 3 
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES, at 299-300 (W. Abbott 
ed., 1994) (arguing for the necessity of a centralized controlling power over commerce to 
balance against the luxury, effeminacy and corruption introduced by foreign trade). 
116. TENCH COXE, AN ENQUIRY INTO PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A COMMERCIAL 
SYSTEM SHOULD BE FOUNDED (1787). 
117. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON 
PAPERS 500-01. 
118. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 9, 1787), in 24 LETTERS 
OF DELEGATES 576. 
119. "A Citizen of Dutchess County", NEW YORK PACKET (Mar. 27, 1785), refer-
enced in JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON: YEOMAN POLITICIAN OF THE NEW 
REPUBLIC 99 (1993). 
120. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 102 (Alexander Hamilton). 
121. Letter from Brwus V to the People of the State of New York (Nov. 27, 1787), 
N.Y. J., (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 427 
122. !d. 
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any internal or dry land taxes. He opposed giving the federal 
government any power to lay excises, duties on written instru-
ments, poll taxes, or land taxes. 123 Brutus did not think the 
buyer-choice argument justified any federal dry or internal taxes. 
Anti-Federalist hatred of direct tax, moreover, included hatred 
of excise taxes. Centinel in Philadelphia, for example, argued 
that to extend federal tax power to "the excise and every specie 
of internal tax would perpetually interfere with state laws. "124 
Cato Utensis, in Virginia feared two rival excisetax men at your 
door. 125 Son of History in New York opposed federal excise 
taxes by which your "bedchamber will be subject to be searched 
by the brutal tools of power, under pretense that they contain 
contraband or smuggled merchandise. "126 Alexander Hamilton 
seems wise in stating that the "genius of the people will ill brook 
the inquisitive and preemptory spirit of excise laws." 127 
The argument that indirect taxes are like sales taxes, passed 
on to a willing buyer, does not work for all indirect taxes. A stamp 
tax on legal documents, for example, is an indirect tax because it 
must have a uniform tax rate and hence cannot be apportioned. 
The testator of a will or the plaintiff in a lawsuit, however, is not a 
seller of goods with a voluntary buyer, and there can be no expec-
tation that the stamp tax will be shifted away from the party who 
pays it. Similarly an excise tax can not be direct because it must 
have a uniform rate. As a tax on whiskey and the like, an excise is 
a tax to suppress immorality and luxury. 128 What makes it an ex-
123. /d. 
124. Centinel II, PHILA. FREEMAN'S J. (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 465. 
125. Cato Utensis, VA. INDEPENDENT CHRON. (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 8 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 75. 
126. Son of History, NEW YORK J., Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 481 (opposing excise taxes by which your "bedchamber will be subject to be 
searched by the brutal tools of power, under pretense that they contain contraband or 
smuggled merchandise). 
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 12 at 57 (Alexander Hamilton) (Nov. 27, 1787). 
128. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Sarsfield (Apr. 3, 1789), in 15 JEFFERSON 
PAPERS 25 (defining "excise" as solely a whiskey tax in New England), quoted in 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 379 (1933); Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George 
Washington (Aug. 18, 1792), 12 HAMILTON PAPERS 235 (extolling a federal excise tax 
because there no article of more general and equal consumption than distilled spirits 
(whiskey)). The Puritan taxes called "excises," however, also taxed other things "for the 
Suppression of Immorality, Luxury and Extravagance." See 4 THE LAW PRACTICE OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, at 302 (Julius Goebel, Jr. & Joseph H. Smith eds. 1980) (de-
scribing the Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island "excises"). See also AN 
ACT FOR LAYING AN EXCISE ON SUNDRY ARTICLES OF CONSUMPTION WITHIN THIS 
STATE (1783) reprinted in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 58 (John 
D. Cushing ed., photo. reprint 1982) (1785) (imposing "excise" on hard liquor plus a 
number of other luxuries, including beaver or felt hats, coffee, and chocolate). 
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cise tax is not the manner of collection,129 but rather the puritani-
cal purpose of suppressing consumption and luxury. Even the im-
post was collected not upon a sale, but rather when the shipper 
landed his goods on the dock under the eye of the customs house. 
There was at the time no tax like a sales tax, collected from the 
seller upon the completion of the sale. 
In Federalist 21, Hamilton applied the pass-on and buyer-
choice arguments to what he termed "taxes on consumption," 
but his audience would have understood taxes on "consumption" 
to refer either to taxes on imported indulgences or to puritanical 
taxes on luxuries and extravagances-that is, either to imposts or 
to excises. 130 "Excises and imposts," as Nathaniel Gorham told 
the Massachusetts ratification convention, were taxes whereby 
"the man of luxury will pay; and the middling and the poor Rarts 
of the community, who live by their industry, will go clear."1 1 
The argument that a tax could be avoided by choice can be 
extended by analogy from the impost onto internal or dry land 
taxes. Whiskey was an item of nearly general consumption at the 
time, but a taxpayer could avoid the whiskey tax by abstinence. 
If that is what is meant by avoidability, however, then all taxes at 
issue are indirect. One could avoid a land tax by never buying 
land. One could avoid the burden on tax on slaves or cotton by 
never owning slaves or raising cotton. If tax rates on income or 
wealth get too high, those taxes could be avoided in full just by 
renouncing all earthly possessions. Indeed, the argument that the 
government will lose revenue by raising rates on wealth and in-
come is a common one. 132 Taking the avoidability argument se-
riously means that the only unavoidable direct tax is a head tax. 
Thus, treating the avoidability as the defining characteristic of 
"indirect" means that the only tax that is direct and needs to be 
129. For a proposal to impose a federal excise on all spirituous liquors to be col-
lected at the place of distillery, see Report of a Committee of Congress (March 11, 1783 ), 
19 JCC 782. 
130. James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 4, 
1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 467 (describing the impost as a tax on consumption); Un-
sent letter from James Madison to John Tyler (1833), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 530 
(saying that New York refused to give up the state impost in order to "tax the consump-
tion of her neighbours"). 
131. Nathaniel Gorham, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 
25, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 106 . 
. 132. For a review of the literature and evidence on the argument that raising rates 
w1ll reduce government revenue, see Austan Goolsbee, Evidence on the High-Income 
Laffer Curve from Six Decades of Tax Reform, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY 1 (1999). 
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apportioned is the head tax. That is an acceptable conclusion to 
133 b . . h p f me, ut 1t 1s not w at ro essor Jensen advocates. 
II. THE REJECTION OF APPORTIONMENT 
A. THE ABSURDITY OF APPORTIONMENT 
Apportionment of direct tax according to population turns 
out to be absurd for reasons that the framers did not understand. 
In the 1796 case of Hylton v. United States, 134 for example, the 
Supreme Court examined a carriage tax, a common and per-
fectly legitimate tax of the times. Carriages are disproportion-
ately an urban vehicle, however, and the Court hypothesized 
that one state might have 10 times more carriages per capita 
than another. 135 To meet apportionment under such circum-
stances, tax rates would have to be 10 times higher on carriages 
in the latter state than in the former. 
There is and never was any reason why people in the latter 
state should pay higher rates on carriages. The carriage tax had 
been a common tax in the colonies and there is nothing espe-
cially suspect about it. The absurdity is forced by the rule of ap-
portionment. Apportionment can be even worse-the first fool 
to drive a carriage into Kentucky would be called upon pay the 
state's entire quota. The result is nonsense. 
Apportionment among the states by population remains ab-
surd. Apportionment victimizes poor states where the tax base 
per capita is especially thin. Connecticut has roughly twice the 
per capita wealth and consumption of Mississippi. 136 An appor-
133. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes, supra note 1, at 80. 
134. 3 u.s. 171 (1796). 
135. /d. at 174. 
136. In 2001, Connecticut had per capita personal income of almost $42,000 and Mis-
sissippi had per capita personal income of almost $22,000. 2002 U.S. CENSUS DEPT. 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 426. Mississippi had a population of 
close to 2.9 million in 2001 (id. at 22), so it had a total potential income tax base of 2.9 
million * $22,000 or $63.8 billion. Connecticut had a population of close to 3.4 million in 
2001 (id.) so it had a total tax base of 3.4 million * $42,000 or $142.8 billion. If the federal 
government needed to collect $72 billion in apportionable direct tax from the two states 
to pay the war debts, the total would be apportioned [3.4/(2.9+3.4)]*72 billion or $39 bil-
lion tax to Connecticut, which would require average tax rates of $39/142.8 or 27%. Of 
the $72 billion, [2.9/(2.9+3.4)]*$72 billion or $33 billion would be allocated to Mississippi, 
and $33 billion/$63.8 billion would require that Mississippians carry a 52% average tax 
rate. The results can be generalized by algebra for any tax base: if State A has only 1/k as 
much tax base per capita as State B, then State A citizens will have to pay average rates 
that are k times the rates in State B. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Tax, supra note 1, 
at 7 n. 24. 
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tioned federal tax on consumption or wealth would mean that 
Mississippians would have to pay tax at rates roughly twice as 
high as Connecticut citizens. Mississippians would need to pay 
tax at twice the rates under apportionment because they are 
comparatively poor and have so little tax base over which to 
spread their quota. This effect was never intended and has never 
been defended, even by proponents of apportionment. 
B. BELIEVING IMPOSSIBLE THINGS 
The arguments used to defend the rule demonstrates that 
the Founders did not understand the absurdity of apportion-
ment. The Founders believed in impossible things. They be-
lieved, for instance, that taxes for which a uniform rate was re-
quired could be apportioned, even though any reasonable 
assumption about the distribution of the taxed items means that 
uniform rates prevent apportionment. The Founders believed 
that apportionment would protect poor states, even though ap-
portionment in fact forces poor states to pay higher rates. The 
Federalists argued, perhaps disingenuously, that apportionment 
would prevent taxes on slaves, even though apportionment in 
fact provides no such assurances. Nor can Apportionment pre-
vent taxes with disparate sectional impact. 
1. The Inconsistency of Apportionment With Uniform Rates 
Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution provides 
that imposts, duties, and excises must be uniform throughout the 
United States. Uniform rates prevents apportionment, but the 
Founders seem to have believed that excises and duties needed 
to apportioned. The only tax that can both be apportioned under 
the required formula and have a uniform tax rate would be a 
"head tax," "capitation tax," or "poll tax" in which each free 
person in a state bears, for instance, a $1000 tax and each slave 
bears a three-fifths tax or $600. Otherwise, apportionment and 
uniformity of rate are inconsistent. The odds against finding any 
other tax base that happens to be equal in every state per capita, 
counting slaves at three-fifths, are impossibly high and even if it 
were found, it would disappear by changes in the tax base by the 
end of the day. The Framers abhorred the head tax, the one tax 
that might satisfr both criteria, and promised that Congress 
would not use it. 1 7 Apportionment of tax by population was the 
137. Nathaniel Gorham, Debate in the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 
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formula for apportioning quotas among the states. It was never 
considered a legitimate formula for determining the subject of 
tax within a state. Population figures in the formula, John Ad-
ams explained, were adopted "as an index of the wealth of the 
state & not as subjects of taxation." 138 
Apportionment could be satisfied by first assigning each 
state a quota by population and then collecting the quota by a 
mishmash of taxes that varied by state. 139 None of the taxes used 
in the states could be excises or duties because the excises and 
duties must have a uniform rate throughout the United States. 
Apportionment would thus destroy the use of excises and duties, 
which the Founders considered to be excellent sources of federal 
revenue. There could also be no nationally consistent tax base or 
tax policy under such a program. Citizens of different states 
would face different tax rates. There would be many enclaves 
with relatively low tax rates luring citizens facing higher rates in 
their home states. An apportioned tax is too much like the requi-
sition system, and the framers said that they did not want "to 
drive the Legislature to the plan of [r]equisitions." 140 Even be-
yond the mismash, apportionment of federal tax among the 
states by population necessarily imposes the most oppressive 
rates on the poorest states because poor states have the thinnest 
tax base over which to spread their quota. No adjustment of 
taxed items or rates can avoid that. 
The Founders did not know that uniformity and apportion-
ment were inconsistent. They commonly categorized the "excises" 
and "duties," which must be uniform, as "direct taxes," which 
25, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATEs 106 (calling the head tax "a distressful tax" which 
"would never be adopted"); Francis Dana, Debates in Massachusetts Ratifying Conven-
tion (Jan. 18, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 43 (saying that "a capitation tax is abhorrent 
to the feelings of human nature, and, I venture to trust, will never be adopted by Con-
gress"); Letter from James Madison to Jos. C. Cabell (Sept. 18, 1828) in 4 ELLIOT'S 
DEBATES 605 ('the odious tax on persons"); Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject 
of Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791) in 10 HAMILTON PAPERS 330 (stating that poll taxes are 
unfriendly to manufacture and injurious to the industrious poor). 
138. John Adams (Mass.), Debate in the Continental Congress (July 12, 1776) in 4 
LETTERS OF DELEGATES 440 (Jefferson notes) (saying that numbers of people were 
taken as an index of the wealth of the state not as subjects of taxation). 
139. Edmund Randolph, Debates in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 7, 
1788) in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1006, 1022 (saying that if a tax was laid on one uni-
form article throughout the Union, its operation would be oppressive, but that a tax will 
undoubtedly be laid in each state in the manner that will best accommodate the people). 
140. George Mason, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 12, 1787) in 1 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 592. Cf. Gouverneur Morris, Speech to the Federal Convention 
(July 17, 1787) in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 26 (opposing requisitions, "which are subver-
sive of the idea of government"). 
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must be apportioned. Madison, the most important drafter of the 
Constitution, did not know that apportioned taxes could not be 
uniform even after the completion of the ratification debates. At 
the start of the new Congress in 1789, for instance, Hamilton 
sought Madison's private advice on what taxes the new federal 
government should impose. Madison replied that he would not 
recommend a general stamp tax (i.e., a "duty" in constitutional 
terms), in part because it "could not be so framed as to fall in due 
proportion on the States without more information than can be 
speedily obtained. "141 A stamp tax can never be framed "to fall in 
due proportion" upon the states, even with unlimited time, be-
cause it is a duty that must have a uniform rate. One should not 
need more information or investigation to ascertain the impossi-
bility. In the tax arguments in the new Congress, moreover, Madi-
son called a tax on domestic whiskey a "direct tax," 142 even 
though the whiskey tax is the paradigm of an "excise." An excise 
cannot be apportioned. Madison simply did not know that uni-
form rates precluded apportionment, even after more than three 
years of debate over the constitutional text. 
The Anti-Federalists also explicitly defined "direct tax," 
which must be apportioned, to include "excises," which cannot 
be apportioned. The Anti-Federalists hated allowing the federal 
government to levy direct taxes. Had any of them understood 
that direct tax and uniformity were inconsistent, they would have 
used the impossibility of uniform rates against the direct tax. In a 
brief to the Supreme Court in Hylton, arguing for the unconsti-
tutionality of the carriage tax, Anti-Federalist John Taylor of 
Caroline argued that apportionment "was the most important 
stipulation of the whole compact" and that evasion of the restric-
tion by a subterfuge of a "direct excise" would leave Congress 
"free to levy any tax without restraint." 143 Notwithstanding Tay-
lor's passion, one cannot apportion an excise any more than one 
can have a square circle. 
141. Letter from James Madison to Alexander Hamilton (Nov. 19, 1789), in 12 
MADISON PAPERS 449-50. 
142. James Madison, Debates in the House of Representatives (Dec. 27, 1790), in 14 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 190 (William C. DiGia-
comantonio, eta!., ed. 1995). 
143. John Taylor, "An Argument Respecting the Constitutionality of the Carriage 
Tax" at 33 (May 1795) quoted in 4 LAW AND PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 
supra note 124, at 327. ' 
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2. Protection for the Poor? 
The debaters also misunderstood the effect of apportion-
ment. Hugh Williamson, a North Carolina delegate to the Phila-
delphia convention, favored apportionment on the ground that 
the rule would protect his poorer state. Land taxes had to be ap-
portioned according to the number of inhabitants, he wrote. "Is 
it not a pleasing consideration," he asked, "that North-Carolina, 
under her natural disadvantages, must have the same facility of 
paying her share of the public debt as the most favored, or the 
most fortunate State?"14 In fact, if North Carolina were a disad-
vantaged state, as Williamson said, she would have lower "facil-
ity" of paying her quota and would have to bear higher tax rates 
than more advantaged states. Tax rates would have to be higher 
on land in North Carolina because North Carolina as a poor 
state would have less value in land over which to spread its 
quota. Apportionment hurts rather than helps poor states. 
In a 1792 congressional debate, Hugh Williamson opposed a 
federal subsidy on cod fishing boats on the grounds that it in effect 
made the tax burden unequal across the states. He argued that 
"the present Constitution would never had been adopted" had 
not it contained the uniformity requirement and the apportion-
ment requirement. 145 These safeguards, he said, prevented Con-
gress from imposing unequal burdens or gratifying one part of the 
Union by oppressing another. 146 A difficulty with the argument is 
that uniformity and apportionment are not parallel safeguards but 
inconsistent. It is of course possible to apportion some taxes and 
have uniform rates for others, but one cannot have both appor-
tionment and uniform rates for the same tax. If uniformity of rates 
is a wise requirement, which was Williamson's primary pitch 
against the cod subsidy, then apportionment cannot be. 
3. Protection for Slaveholders? 
Madison argued in the Virginia ratification convention that 
apportionment would prevent taxation of slaves. The argument 
was cleverly used to convince slaveholders to ratify, but it is false 
to both the history and the text. At the convention, Anti-
144. Hugh Williamson, Remarks on the Plan of Government (1788) reprinted in 
FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE OTHER FEDERALISTS: 1787-1788 
(Callen A. Sheehan and Gary L. McDowell, eds. 1998). 
145. Hugh Williamson, Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 7, 1792) 
in 3 ANNALS 379-380. 
146. !d. 
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Federalist Patrick Henry opposed the Constitution on the 
ground that Congress could use its tax power to force manumis-
sion.147 Madison responded that apportionment would protect 
slavery from high taxes. Congress could not annihilate slavery by 
taxation, Madison claimed, because the "taxation of the State (is 
to be] equal only to its representation. "148 Other Virginia Feder-
alists agreed that Congress could not tax slaves at so high a rate 
as to amount to emancipation because "taxation and representa-
tion were fixed by the Constitution according to the census," so 
that Congress could not tax slaves out of existence "without ru-
ining free people in other states."149 Anti-Federalists Patrick 
Henry and George Mason replied, quite correctly, that they 
could see no color to the argument that apportionment gave se-
curity to slavery. The state's quota of an apportioned or direct 
tax was to be determined in proportion to population, they ar-
gued, but Congress would still set the objects of tax within the 
state. Once a state's quantum was fixed, Congress could require 
the full amount to be laid on slaves alone. 150 Madison was wrong 
and Mason and Henry were right. Apportionment affects only 
the allocation of taxes among the states and has no effect objects 
of taxes within the state. Congress could have required that Vir-
ginia pay its entire quota by taxing only its slaves at prohibitive 
rates. The constitutional text gave Congress the power to target 
slaves through taxation even to the point of manumission. 
147. Patrick Henry, Debate in the Virginia Convention (June 17, 1788), in 10 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1341-1342 (arguing that Congress might lay such heavy taxes 
on slaves, amounting to emancipation, such "that this property would be lost to this 
country"). 
148. James Madison, Speech to the Virginia Convention (June 17, 1787) in 3 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1339 (arguing that apportionment will prevent Congress from 
imposing oppressive taxes on tobacco or slaves that Northern states would escape); see 
also James Madison, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 12,1788), in 3 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1204 (arguing that our State is secured because its proportion 
of tax shall be commensurate to its population); James Madison, Debate in the Virginia 
Ratification Convention (June 17,1788), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1342-43 (arguing 
that the census was intended to introduce equality into the burdens to be laid on the 
community). See also John Taylor, An Argument Concerning the Constitutionality fo the 
Carriage Tax at 20, 13, 14, quoted in 4 PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 
124, at 321 (arguing that if apportionment is not required of direct excise taxes, then the 
whole burden of government could be exclusively laid on slave-holding states). 
149. George Nichols, Speech to the Ratification Convention (June 17, 1787), in 3 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 457; "The State Soldier IV," VIRGINIA INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE 
(Mar. 19, 1788), reprinted in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 509,511. 
150. Patrick Henry, Speech to the Ratification Convention (June 17, 1787) in 3 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 457; George Mason, Speech to the Ratification Convention (June 17, 
1787) m 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 458. 
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Slaveholders later argued that apportionment was adopted to 
prevent "any special tax upon negro slaves"151 or indeed to pre-
vent a tax on slaves.152 This position drew support from Madison's 
argument that apportionment would prevent a high tax on slaves. 
Constitutional history shows that the argument is exactly back-
wards. Apportionment of tax, counting slaves at three-fifths, was 
adopted to discourage slavery, not to protect it. Madison later ar-
gued that we should look to the ratification debates to fill out the 
meaning of the text of the Constitution.153 Arguments for impos-
sible things and arguments that misdescribe both the text and the 
history, however, are entitled to no credence. 
4. Prevent "Blatantly Sectional" Taxes? 
Professor Erik Jensen has recently argued that apportion-
ment blocks "blatantly sectional" federal taxes and allows "only 
those levies with uniformly distributed bases-'equal per capita 
among the states."' 154 For example, if Congress proposed a tax 
on dogsleds, the impact of the tax would be felt almost entirely 
in Alaska, even if the tax had a uniform rate. "If the dogsled tax 
is considered direct, however," Jensen argues, "the apportion-
ment rule would require that Mississippi citizens also bear a pro-
portionate share of the total tax burden (measured by Missis-
sippi's percentage of the national population)... and the 
enthusiasm of Mississip~i Congressmen ... for the tax would be 
substantially lessened. "1 5 
Preventing blatantly sectional taxes would have been a very 
plausible constitutional value. Delegates to the Convention 
complained bitterly whenever they detected an~ possibility of 
discriminatory impact against their home states.1 6 The difficulty 
is that apportionment of tax does not prevent discrimination. 
151. Abraham Baldwin (Ga.), Debates in the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 
12, 1790), in 1 ANNALS 1243. 
152. Abraham Baldwin (Ga.), Debates in the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 
12, 1796), in 12 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 309 
(Helen Veit ed., 1994) (direct tax clause prevents a tax on slaves). 
153. James Madison, Speech in the U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 6, 1796), in 
3 FARRAND's RECORDS 374. (saying that if we look the meaning beyond the face of the 
instrument, we must look for it, not in the Philadelphia Convention, which proposed the 
Constitution but in the state conventions which accepted and ratified it). 
154. Erik Jensen, The Constitlttion Matters in Taxation, 100 TAX NOTES 821, 825 
(2003). 
155. ld. 
156. Oliver Ellsworth, Debate in the Connecticut Ratification Convention (Jan. 7, 
1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 192 (saying that the people of Connecticut pay more than 
$50,000 annually into New York's treasury by reason of the New York impost on harbor 
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First, Congress could enact a prohibitive excise tax on dog-
sleds (or slaves), even if it were sectional in impact. The first 
definition of excise tax in the constitutional era was the whiskey 
tax, but the existing taxes called "Excises" also reached other 
similar objects "for the Suppression of Immorality, Luxury 
and Extravagance." Both slaves and dogsleds can be defined as 
either immoral or extravagant. Even if you define excises as like 
sales taxes, as Professor Jensen would, Congress can still impose 
prohibitive tax rates solely on sales of slaves or dogsleds. Ex-
cises, after all, were originally supposed to discourage immoral-
ity, luxury, and extravagance. For much of our history, tariffs on 
imports were set high enough to foreclose any foreign competi-
tion as to the taxed item.157 However excises are defined, in any 
event, an excise tax can have a prohibitively high rate, so long as 
the rate chosen is uniform across states. 
If excises were not available, moreover, Congress could 
adopt an apportioned tax on slaves or dogsleds without any seri-
ous impediment. An apportioned tax on dogsleds would be a 
dead letter in Mississippi, just as a slave tax could not have been 
collected in Maine, but dead-letter taxes that could not be col-
lected were normal in the founding era. 158 The apportioned dog-
sled tax would be collected in Alaska, perhaps at high rates, 
without affecting any other state, and that would satisfy appor-
tionment. Congress could say that a state's entire quota must fall 
on slaves or on dogsleds. Except for the specifically prohibited 
tax on exports, Congress can impose any kind of tax it wants. 
Apportionment, moreover, does not affect how a total tax 
burden falls. There is no requirement under the apportionment 
clause that the tax burden be apportioned across the states by 
population, as Professor Jensen says, but only that a direct tax be 
apportioned. Any one listening to the constitutional debates 
would think that a "direct tax" would be rare. The Federalists 
promised that they would avoid direct taxes except in emergencies 
traffic); George Mason, Debate in the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787) in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 631 (arguing that allowing Congress to enact a navigation act by 
mere majority vote, giving certain shippers a monopoly, would enable a few rich mer-
chants in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston to reduce the value of Southern staples by 
half); Governeur Morris, Debate in the Federal Convention (July 17, 1787) in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 26 (describing state paper money as a trick, "by which Citizens of 
other States may be affected"). 
157. See, e.g., G. R. Hawke, infra note 216 (estimating U.S. tariffs at over 100% of 
value in the late nineteenth century). 
158. See, e.g., STANLEY ELKINS & ERICK MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 
469 (1993) (saying that the state whiskey taxes of the 1780s were a virtual dead letter in 
the West all along). 
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because they were so hard to collect. The term "direct taxes" was 
collapsing on itself during the Constitutional Era, shedding "du-
ties" and "excises," even by reason of the Constitution itself. 
There was no assurance that any tax would be apportioned, much 
less that the "total tax burden" would be apportioned. 
Professor Jensen's filter is ultimately so fine that it excludes 
all taxes except a tax the Founders renounced. Professor Jensen 
says that the purpose of apportionment is to require Congress to 
impose only those levies with uniformly distributed bases-
"equal per capita among the states." The only tax base that is 
strictly equal per capita among the states, counting slaves at 
three-fifths, is a head tax, but the Founders denounced the the 
head tax as "odious," "distressful," "abhorrent to the feelings of 
human nature," and "unfriendly to manufacture and injurious to 
the industrious poor." 159 
The apportionment requirement does not prevent taxes 
with disparate sectional impact. The only remaining effect is to 
kill federal taxes that a democracy might otherwise use. Profes-
sor Jensen may not mind that his filter kills all taxes, except one 
that is politically impossible, but the Founders would definitely 
have minded. The primary purpose of the Constitution was to 
raise revenue to pay war debts. 
Professor Jensen claims that he alone is taking the Constitu-
tion seriously-that "the Constitution matters in tax." 160 "Even 
imperfect provisions" [like apportionment], he argues, "should 
be interpreted in as robust a way as possible."161 That is non-
sense. Tax and apportionment are inconsistent, sometimes and 
perhaps always. Apportionment kills every tax, except those that 
politics will kill. Thanks to the inconsistency, you cannot avoid 
nullification, no matter how badly you want to preserve all parts 
of the Constitution, because one side or the other of the incon-
sistency has to disappear. To escape a constitutional inconsis-
tency, you need to weigh the importance of the two sides and 
preserve the more important. 
As soon as you weigh tax and apportionment together, appor-
tionment is gone. Apportionment was a chip given to the North to 
acquiesce in allowing the South to count its slaves in determining 
representation in the House. When slavery ended, so ended the his-
torical purpose of apportionment. Raising federal revenue to pay 
159. See supra note 137. 
160. Jensen, The Consciwcion Maccers in Tax, supra note 1. 
161. !d. at 824. 
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war debts, by contrast, was the major purpose of the Constitution 
and it continues to have considerable importance. 
Professor Jensen also concludes that he is not arguing that 
Constitution requires an impotent national revenue system, be-
cause the Sixteenth Amendment unquestionably allows Con-
gress to enact an unapportioned income tax. 162 This issue, how-
ever, had to be settled before 1913 when the Sixteenth 
Amendment was ratified and when no income tax would be 
available. The resolution between tax and apportionment 
reached before 1913, moreover, would govern after 1913, be-
cause the Sixteenth Amendment is a pro-tax amendment. It does 
authorize an income tax, but it can not be interpreted to kill eve-
rything but the income tax. 
C. HEROIC HYLTON 
In the 1796 case of Hylton v. United States, 163 the Supreme 
Court held that a tax on carriages was not a direct tax on the 
ground that apportionment of the tax was not reasonable. The 
Court reasoned that if New York had ten times more carriages 
per capita than Virginia, tax rates to meet apportionment would 
have to be ten times higher in Virginia than in New York. The 
Court saw the stupidity of that result, and it rejected the appor-
tionment rule that would require it. 
Alexander Hamilton argued on behalf of the government in 
Hylton. Hamilton had long ago decided that apportionment un-
der any formula could not reach the wealth of the nation. 164 Ap-
portionment in the form of requisitions had failed utterly. 165 The 
Founders felt the desperate need for federal taxes to restore the 
public credit, in order to defend the nation from the rapacious 
empires of England, Spain, and France. Hamilton had borne the 
awesome responsibility of finding enough taxes, by smoke and 
mirrors if need be, to convince the Dutch and other foreign lend-
ers that the country could pay its debts in an orderly fashion. 166 
162. /d. at 842-43. 
163. 3 U.S. 171 (1796). 
164. THE FEDERALIST No. 21 at 101 (Alexander Hamilton) (Dec. 12, 1787) (saying 
that no formula for apportioning taxes among the states could equitably capture the 
wealth of the nation because the factors that contributed to wealth were "too complex, 
minute, or adventitious to admit of a particular specification"). 
165. See. e.g., ROGER H. BROWN, REDEEMING THE REPUBLIC: FEDERALISTS, 
TAXATION, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1993). 
166. James C. Riley, Foreign Credit and Fiscal Stability: Dutch Investment in the 
United States, 1781-1794, 65 J. AM. HIST. 654, 664-68,672-75 (1978) (arguing that Ameri-
can taxes d1d not grow enough to carry the interest on American debt until the impost 
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Hamilton argued that the nation was threatened by war 167 and 
that public credit was essential to public safety. 168 War debt was 
also "the price of liberty," as Hamilton put it, for which "the 
faith of America has been repeatedly pledged." 169 Finding fed-
eral taxes to pay the war debts represented the highest ideals of 
preserving the nation and the republican form of government. 170 
Hamilton argued that the federal carriage tax was not a di-
rect tax because "no construction ought to prevail calculated to 
defeat the express and necessary authority of the govern-
ment."171 "It would be contrary to reason," he said, "and to 
every rule of sound construction, to adopt a principle for regulat-
ing the exercise of a clear constitutional power which would de-
feat the exercise of the power." 172 The argument had been criti-
cal to Congress's adoption of the tax. 173 
The Supreme Court agreed that if apportionment was not 
reasonable, the tax was not direct: 
The Constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as direct 
taxes but only such as Congress could lay in proportion to the 
census. The rule of apportionment is only to be adopted in 
such cases where it can reasonably apply; and the subject 
taxed, must ever determine the application of the rule. 174 
grew sufficiently by 1796, but that the Dutch fooled themselves with Hamilton's taxes 
into extending more credit). 
167. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jan. 1, 1788) (saying 
that national defense can "know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and 
the resources of the community"); THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 161 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (Jan. 5, 1788) ("to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquil-
ity, is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human character"); see also James Wilson, 
Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 11, 1787) in 2 FARRAND'S 
RECORDS 526 ("The prospect of a war was highly probable"). 
168. THE FEDERALIST NO. 30, at 146-47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Dec. 28, 1787). 
168. ld. 
169. Alexander Hamilton, "Report Relative for a Provision for the Support of Public 
Credit" (1790) in 6 HAMILTON PAPERS 69. 
170. See, e.g, Report of the Board of Treasury (Feb. 8, 1786), in 30 JCC 54, 57 (say-
ing that states failure to pay apportioned quotas threatened not only "the existence of the 
Union, but of those great and invaluable privileges, for which they have so arduously and 
honorably contended"). 
171. Alexander Hamilton, Law Brief on the Carriage Tax, Hylton v. United States 
(1795) reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 845,846 (John C. Hamil-
ton, ed., 1851 ). 
172. ld. 
173. Theodore Sedgwick (Mass.), Debate in the U.S. House of Representatives 
(May 6, 1794) in 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES 433 (arguing that "the legislature was authorized 
to impose a tax on ... carriages" and that because a tax on carriages "could not be appor-
tioned by the constitutional ratio, it would follow, irresistibly, that such a tax, ... was not 
'direct"'). 
174. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 174 (1796) (Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted). 
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Alternatively stated, "[a]s all direct taxes must be apportioned, it 
is evident that the Constitution contemplated none as direct but 
such as could be apportioned." 175 A tax on carriages was deemed 
to be not a direct tax as a matter of law so that it would not have 
to be apportioned. 
The Hylton rationale remained good constitutional doctrine 
for a hundred years. In 1868, for example, the Supreme Court 
held that a Civil War tax on the income and principal of insur-
ance companies was constitutional although not apportioned. 
The tax was not direct because the apportionment would yield 
an unacceptable consequence: 
The consequences, which would follow the apportionment of 
the tax ... in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, must 
not be overlooked. They are very obvious. Where [insurance] 
corporations are numerous and rich, it might be light; where 
none exist, it could not be collected; where they are few and 
poor, it would fall upon them with such weight as to involve 
annihilation. It cannot be supposed that the framers of the 
Constitution intended that any tax should be apportioned, the 
collection of which on that principle would be attended with 
such results. The consequences are fatal to the proposition. 176 
In Scholey v. Rew, 177 decided in 1875, the Court held on the same 
logic that a tax on wealth transmitted at death was not direct: 
If all taxes that political economists regard as direct taxes should 
be held to fall within those words in the Constitution, Congress 
would be deprived of the practical power to impose such taxes, 
and the taxing power would be . . . crippled; for no Congress 
would dare to apportion, for instance, the income tax. 178 
Scholey shows that Hylton was based upon the adoption of a 
functional analysis and not on a crude invocation of categories of 
tax. In the period just before the adoption of the Constitution, 
"direct tax" had included the estate tax. 179 
175. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 181 (Iredell, J.) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 179 
(Paterson, 1.) ("A tax on carriages, if apportioned, would be oppressive and pernicious"); 
cf Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 158 U.S. 429, 687 (Brown, 1., dissenting) ("[I]t as 
very clear that the clause requiring direct taxes to be apportioned to the population has 
no application to taxes which are not capable of apportionment according to popula-
tion"). 
176. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 446 (1868). 
177. 90 u.s. 331 (1875). 
178. /d. at 343. 
179. Letter of Rufus King to John Adams (Oct. 3, 1786), in 23 LEITERS OF 
DELEGATES 581 (saying that the sum, excepting dollars "which are raised by Imposts & 
Excises, must be raised from the People by an immediate and direct apportionment upon 
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Finally, in Springer v. United States, 180 the Court held in 
1881 on the logic and authority of Hylton that the Civil War in-
come tax on individuals was not direct: 
It was well held [in Hylton] that where such evils would attend 
the apportionment of a tax, the Constitution could not have 
intended that an apportionment should be made. This view 
applies with even greater force to the [income] tax in question 
in this case. Where the population is large and the incomes 
are few and small, it would be intolerably oppressive. 181 
For the first hundred years of the Constitution's history, venom-
ous apportionment was rendered harmless. 
III. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE JUDICIAL 
VETOONTAX 
A. POLLOCK COMES INTO THE GARDEN 
In the 1895 case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,182 
the Supreme Court overruled Hylton and its successor cases by a 
5-4 margin. Without citing Hylton, Pollock required the federal 
income tax to be apportioned. Apportionment is silly for an in-
come tax because per capita income is not equal among the 
states. Tax rates under apportionment would have to be higher 
in poorer states. Apportionment might even be impossible in a 
mobile economy, especially one with corporate taxpayers and 
integrated national businesses, because it is impossible to ascer-
tain the state quota to which various tax payments should be 
credited. Harangued b~ the taxpayer's lawyer that the income 
tax was communistic,1 however, the Supreme Court made it 
impossible to impose the tax. The Pollock majority invented a 
false history and rationale for apportionment, saying that the 
rule was designed "to prevent an attack upon accumulated prop-
erty by mere force of numbers." 184 Justice Field announced, 
apocalyptically, that the income tax's 
assault upon capital is but the beginning. It will be but the 
the Polls & Estates of the Inhabitants" (emphasis added)). 
180. 102 u.s. 586 (1881). 
181. !d. at 600. 
182. 157 u.s. 429 (1895). 
183. !d. at 532 (argument of Joseph Choate, attorney for appellant Pollock) (saying 
that income tax is "communistic in its purposes and tendencies" and was defended before 
the Court by principles of communism). 
184. !d. at 583. 
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stepping-stone to others, larger and more sweeping, till our 
political contests will become a war of the poor against the 
rich-a war constantly growing in intensity and bitterness. 'If 
the court sanctions the [graduated income tax,], it will mark 
the hour when the sure decadence of our present government 
will commence.' 185 
337 
Apportionment, the majority opinion said, was "one of the bul-
warks of private rights and private property." 186 
While preventing a tax on accumulated wealth might well 
have expressed the intent of the Pollock majority, that intent 
turned the historical meaning on its head. Apportionment by 
population was originally a means to reach wealth by taxing ac-
cording to relative wealth of the states. The Founders believed in 
wealth taxes. The most significant wealth of the time lay in land, 
and land taxes were the primary sources of government reve-
nue.187 When Hamilton asked Madison, for instance, for recom-
mendations on taxes the new government should impose, Madi-
son advised a federal tax on land as "an essential branch of 
national revenue ... before a preoccupancy by the States be-
comes an impediment." 188 The Founders often expressed 
sympathy with the aristocratic notions that those "who own 
the country ought to govern it" 189 and that wealth, representa-
tion, and taxes should go together. 190 Within those premises, 
however, the wealthy of the country would pay its taxes. 
Pollock seems to be a victim of a bad reading of the Consti-
tution. The text says that taxes of a certain kind must be appor-
tioned among the states according to population. From appor-
tionment according to population, the Justices reverse-
engineered a rationale that apportionment must have been in-
185. !d. at 607. 
186. !d. at 583. 
187. See, e.g., the Treasury survey of state taxes in 1796, which includes land taxes in 
all thirteen states. Wolcott, Direct Taxes, supra note 88, at 418-41. 
188. Letter from James Madison to Alexander Hamilton (Nov. 19, 1789), in 12 
MADISON PAPERS 449-50. 
189. See, e.g., Richard Hofstadter, The Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism, in THE 
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 73, 84 (Robert H. Horwitz, ed., 
1977) (quoting John Jay). 
190. MADISON, JULY 11, 1787, IN CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND'S 
RECORDS: THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1887 at 585 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911) ("It was said that Representation & taxation were to go together; that taxation 
& wealth ought to go together"); accord, id at 563 (Rufus King: Mass. Federalist); id. at 
601 (Elbridge Gerry: Mass. Anti-Federalist); MADISON, AUGUST 7, 1787, IN 
CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS: THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1887 at 202 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (Oliver Ellsworth: Conn. 
Federalist). 
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tended to protect wealthy states from populous states. When the 
income tax came into effect after the Sixteenth Amendment, 
three-quarters of its revenue came from just eight rich states. 
New York alone would pay thirty-five percent of the income 
tax. 191 If rich states had a right to avoid tax, that right cried for a 
remedy. If the right of wealthy states was important, then narrow 
interpretations should be avoided. If the wealthy states were to 
be protected, then the clause must have been intended "to pre-
vent an attack upon accumulated property by mere force of 
numbers." 192 A tax that fell disproportionately on wealth, such as 
the income tax, must have been the kind of tax that apportion-
ment was meant to prohibit. 
The difficulty with this argument is that both the rationale 
and the consequent right are contrived. Apportionment by 
population was originally intended to be a measurement of 
wealth of a state. Apportionment had nothing to do with taxes 
within a state. Having set the quota for a state, Congress can 
make the tax payable only by the wealthy, perhaps by one per-
son, without violating apportionment. Because the Founders 
treated population solely as the measure of wealth, historically 
accurate thinking would treat the wealthy and the populous 
states as the same, within an acceptable margin of error. Appor-
tionment by population was a mere proxy for wealth. If New 
York were wealthier, then the historical purpose of apportion-
ment was to make New York pay more tax. Pollock turned the 
historical meaning of the apportionment requirement upside-
down. 
Pollock also said that the purpose of apportionment was to 
prevent the imposition of tax on a single state by an overall na-
tional majority: "Nothing can be clearer than that what the Con-
stitution intended to guard against was the exercise by the gen-
eral government of the power of directly taxing persons and 
property within any State through a majority made up from the 
other States. "193 This language has no constitutional justification. 
An overall majority in both the House and the Senate can adopt 
federal taxes, and apportionment does nothing to change that. 
There is no requirement that a state must agree to a federal tax 
for individuals within the state to be subject to the tax, and there 
is no immunity from a federal tax if a majority within a state re-
191. JOHN D. 8UENKER, INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 10 (1985). 
192. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 583. 
193. !d. at 582 
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jects the tax. The Constitution, more generally, does not give 
each state some kind of Calhounian veto on federal legislation. 
The Constitution created not a compact among states, but a fed-
eral government resting directly on the sovereignty of the people 
and able to raise revenue without the states' approval. 194 If Con-
gress passes a tax, it does not matter what a state thinks. 
Finally, as a matter of history apportionment was adopted 
to decrease Southern incentive to increase slaves to increase rep-
resentation in Congress; to interpret apportionment as having 
any broader purpose than as an anti-slavery provision is to rip 
apportionment out of its historical context and to destroy its 
original meaning. 
B. POLLOCK BEATEN BACK 
Pollock soon lost both legal and political legitimacy. The 
Court expanded the definition of "excise tax" to avoid appor-
tionment in any tax case that came before it. Even the income 
tax could qualify as an excise. Elite opinion also turned against 
the case, and the income tax won support deep within the heart 
of the Republican Party. In the end Congress and the states 
overwhelmingly adopted the Sixteenth Amendment. All parties 
and geographical sections chose to allow federal tax without ap-
portionment, even an income tax. 
1. The Judicial Withering of Pollock 
Almost immediately the Supreme Court began retreating 
from what it later called Pollock's "mistaken theory." 195 The 
Court expanded the definition of "excise tax" elastically so that 
it could swallow the world of federal tax. "Excise" was a narrow 
term at the time of the Constitution. It referred foremost to the 
whiskey tax. Beyond whiskey, it referred mostly to sin and lux-
ury taxes, enacted to suppress vice and encourage righteousness. 
In reaction to Pollock, however, the Court expanded "excise" 
dramatically. Four years after Pollock, the Court held that a 
trade tax on the Chicago Board of Trade was an excise tax. 196 
Five years after Pollock, the Court held that the graduated es-
194. James Wilson, Debate in the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 11, 
1787) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 502 (arguing that the states had no sovereignty because the 
principle of this Constitution is that "the supreme power resides in the people"). 
195. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 113 (1916). 
196. Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509,519 (1899) (holding that a tax on the use rather 
than the mere ownership of property was an "excise"). 
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tate tax was an excise tax. 197 If the Pollock Court had thought in 
1895 that it could protect accumulated capital from congres-
sional assault, the Court's decision in 1900 that Congress could 
enact a graduated estate tax terminated that rationale. In 1904, 
the Supreme Court held that a tax on a corporation's gross re-
ceipts was an excise tax that did not have to be apportioned.198 
That decision, in turn, justified a tax on the net income of a cor-
poration, although the decision did not come down until 1911, 
after Congress had passed the Sixteenth Amendment. 199 A tax 
on corporate business receipts or a corporate income tax is at 
least as much an assault on accumulated wealth as an individual 
income tax. 
Cordell Hull thought that the Court would also allow an in-
dividual income tax. After all, he wrote, if the corporate tax 
could be justified as a tax on doing business as a corporation, 
then why could a tax on individual income not be justified as a 
tax on doing business as an individual?200 Even conservative 
Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island said he considered the 
corporate tax to be an income tax, except for the name.201 The 
excise taxes on stock trades, gross receipts of a corporation, and 
estates surely already had very little resemblance to a whiskey 
tax, so that "excise tax" looked like an infinitely malleable term 
used functionally simply to avoid apportionment. 
By 1929, the Court summarized the excise tax exemption 
excusing from apportionment "a tax imposed upon a particular 
use of property or the exercise of a single power over property 
incidental to ownership."202 The use-versus-mere-ownership ra-
tionale was itself an opportunistic rationale, albeit an old one. It 
arose only after the founding period, and only after Congress 
had realized that apportionment was a hobble and thus sought to 
invent narrow definitions of "direct tax."203 Even though all of 
197. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 78 (1900). The Pollock Court itself had distin-
guished the income tax from a tax on "business, privileges, or employments" saying that 
the latter might be constitutional as an excise tax. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 635. 
198. Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904). 
199. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150 (1911) (holding that the corporate 
income tax was not imposed on the mere ownership of property, but upon the conducting 
of a business in corporate form). 
200. MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 66 (1948). 
201. 44 CONG. REC. 4232 (1909). 
202. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929). 
203. The apparent earliest use of the use-versus-mere-ownership distinction oc-
curred in 1794, when Representative Fisher Ames of Massachusetts argued in Congress 
that a tax on carriages was an excise tax because "the duty falls not on the possession, but 
the use." 4 ANNALS 729 (1794). By 1794, it was known that apportionment was an obsta-
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these cases represented heroic expansions of the original mean-
ing of "excise" and reflected the opportunistic use of words to 
limit Pollock to its facts, the excise cases were properly decided 
because it was Pollock that was illegitimate. 
2. The Political Withering of PolloclC04 
Thanks to the Court's dramatic expansion of the "excise" 
tax exception to apportionment, the only important tax that re-
mained apportionable by the time Congress began considering 
the Sixteenth Amendment was the individual income tax itself. 
The only reason that Pollock was not challenged on the income 
tax itself was continuing respect for the Supreme Court as an in-
stitution, despite its error in Pollock. The Sixteenth Amend-
ment, proposed by Congress in 1909 and ratified in 1913, over-
ruled Pollock in its last significant redoubt. 
The 1894 income tax, declared unconstitutional in Pollock, 
was a Democratic Party bill that drew almost no support from 
Republicans. Party rhetoric and behavior, however, were "de-
militarized" as the country moved from the angry disputes of the 
Populist 1890s into the Progressive Era after the turn of the cen-
tury.205 Vehement opposition to the income tax on principle, 
which had characterized the Republican dissent in 1894 and the 
Pollock decision itself, disappeared. When the partisan anger 
subsided, Republicans accepted the income tax, at least as a 
cle and Ames was looking for a new, narrow definition of direct tax that would allow the 
federal government to raise revenue without apportionment. Madison disagreed with the 
claimed definition. !d. Since carriage taxes were listed in the Treasury inventory of direct 
taxes at the time, Madison had the better of the argument, at least before Hylton held 
that the consequences of unreasonable consequences of apportionment rendered a tax 
not direct. Hylton itself involved carriages for hire and for personal usc, and the tax fell 
on the carriage no matter what its use. 
204. My interpretation of the politics of the income tax owes a great deal to Charles 
V. Stewart, The Federal Income Tax and the Realignment of the 1890s, REALIGNMENT IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS: TOWARD A THEORY 263 (Bruce A. Campbell and Richard J. Trill-
ing eds. 1980) (showing generally how elite opinion came to accept the income tax, albeit 
as a supplement to other taxes). Alternative explanations not endorsed here include 
Bennett D. Baack & Edward John Ray, Special Interests and the Adoption of the Income 
Tax in the United State, 45 1. ECON. HIST. 607 (1985) (arguing from a public choice per-
spective that political pressure for a reduction in tariffs did not lead to a reduction in 
government spending, as it should have, because of popular support for a naval build-up 
and for Civil War veterans' pensions); ROBERT A. STANLEY, DIMEl'OSIONS OF LAW IN 
THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913 (1993) 
(downplaying progressive sources of the income tax and attributing the income tax in-
stead to conservatives' defense of statist capitalism against attack by the working class 
and by radicals). 
205. WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRI:SGS OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS 72-74 (1970). 
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modest part within a package of other federal taxes. Republicans 
accepted the income tax once it no longer seemed to threaten 
massive redistribution and once the Democratic Party ceased 
threatening class warfare. Elite opinion turned against Pollock 
and the tax-killing apportionment rule, both within the law and 
within politics. The Sixteenth Amendment, allowing the income 
tax without apportionment, passed through Congress and was 
ratified in the states overwhelmingly. 
The 1894 income tax was an unimportant part of a bill that 
principally concerned federal tariffs. Both major parties in the 
1880s and 1890s favored the federal tarift_2°6 There had been an 
income tax on the Union side of the Civil War, but it lapsed in 
1872?07 With the lapse of the Civil War income tax, federal 
revenue came first from tariffs and then from tobacco and whis-
key.208 Tariff policy was an intensely fought partisan issue, but 
only within narrow bounds: The Republicans believed in high 
tariffs to protect domestic industry from foreign competition, 
and the Democrats believed in tariffs, but solely in amounts 
needed by federal programs. 
Republican William McKinley, the victorious presidential 
candidate in 1896 and 1900, argued from the start of his career 
that protectionist tariffs raised the wages of industrial workers. 
"Reduce the tariff," he said, "and labor is the first to suffer."209 
McKinley argued that nobody cared whether consumer prices 
went down if workers did not have wages to pay them and that 
the tariff was paid not by American consumers but by foreign 
competitors. McKinley was said to find in "the dull tax schedules 
that bored other men ... the romance of history in the unfolding 
of the nation's wealth."210 Less sympathetically, economist W. 
Elliot Brownlee has argued that Congressmen achieved political 
206. RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900, at 457-509 (2000) (analyzes voting patterns on tariffs by 
region and party from 1878-1897); SIDNEY RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION: ITS 
HISTORY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN DEMOCRACY 147-50, 160-66 (1942) (discusses the 
Populist Party's endorsement of the income tax before 1894). 
207. For a description of the Civil War income tax, see RATNER, supra note 206, at 
79-86, 89-90, 97-98, 134-35. Ratner estimates that less than 1% of the population had in-
come over the exemptions so as to be exposed to the tax. /d. at 143. 
208. See Table Y258-263: Federal Government Receipts 1789-1957, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, 
at 712 (1980). In 1893, for example, $203,355,000 came from tariffs and of $161,028,000 
came from federal alcohol, tobacco, and stamp taxes. 
209. H. WAYNE MORGAN, WILLIAM MCKINLEY AND HIS AMERICA 60-62 (1963). 
210. /d. at 60-63. 
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power by manipulating complicated tariff schedules to subsidize 
favored industries.211 
The Democratic Party's traditional position, from the time 
that Jefferson reEealed all internal taxes when he was first 
elected President, 12 was that Congress should rely exclusively on 
tariffs. Democrat Grover Cleveland, elected President in 1884 
and again in 1892, argued not against tariffs in principle, but only 
that federal tariffs should not be so high as to yield a surplus 
over the government's needs.213 
The income tax of 1894 that the Court struck down was a 
small part of an attempt to achieve a modest reduction in tariffs. It 
was tacked onto the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 by De-
mocrats alone, without the help of either Republicans or the con-
servative Democratic President, Grover Cleveland. The tax imi-
tated the Civil War income tax, but with a higher exemption and a 
flat 2% tax after the exemption, so that well under 1% of the 
population would pay the tax.214 The Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, 
to which the income tax was attached, shuffled tariffs, reduced 
some rates, and exempted some new goods from tariff, but it also 
increased tariff rates elsewhere.215 Real tariff rates were high-
100% of real value according to one estimate-and, notwithstand-
ing the shuffling, remained high throughout the period.216 
If the income tax had been allowed to reduce tariffs signifi-
cantly, that would have improved the wealth of the nation. Eco-
nomics routinely teaches that a nation maximizes its well-being 
by buying the highest quality goods at the lowest price, even if 
the goods are produced abroad, and by putting its labor and re-
211. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 
35 (1996). 
212. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, First Annual Message to Congress, in 1 BASIC 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335, 337 (PhilipS. Foner, ed., 1944) (calling for the 
elimination of internal taxes, comprehending excises, stamp, auction, license, and car-
riage taxes). See generally DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM, 
1801-1805100-01 (1948). 
213. Grover Cleveland, Third Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1887), in 2 STATE OF THE 
UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at 1587-88 (Fred Israel ed.) (1966) 
(objecting to a $140,000,000 federal surplus). 
214. Descriptions of adoption of the 1894 income tax included STEVEN R. WEISMAN, 
THE GREAT TAX WARS: LINCOLN TO WILSON 105-46 (2002) and RATNER, supra note 
206, at 160-92. The $4000 exemption is estimated to have left only 85,000 taxpayers or 
0.14%, exempting 99.86% of the population. BROWNLEE, supra note 211, at 38. 
215. RATNER, supra note 206, at 174-184; CLARENCE STERN, PROTECTIONIST 
REPUBLICANISM: REPUBLICAN TARIFF POLICY IN THE MCKINLEY PERIOD 44-53 
(1971). 
216. G. R. Hawke, The United States Tariff and Industrial Protection in the Late 
Nineteenth Century, 28 ECON. HIST. REV. 84,96 (1975). 
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sources into a domestic enterprise where some comparative ad-
vantage allows the nation to make the largest possible profit 
from limited national resources. Tariff-free trade is part of the 
larger idea of the benefit of division of labor.217 If economists 
agree on anything, it is wobably on the desirability of free trade 
unhampered by tariffs.2 
In 1894, however, the income tax was an inflammatory is-
sue. The opposition in the debates framed its position around 
supposedly eternal principles. The opposition neither sought nor 
welcomed maneuver or compromise. The 1894 income tax struck 
down in Pollock was a Democratic Party bill that drew almost no 
support from the Republican Party.219 
By end of 1894, however, the Democratic Party that spon-
sored the income tax ceased to be the majority party. Starting 
with the Panic of 1893, the country went into a decade-long de-
pression. At worst, unemployment reached 20% and the econ-
omy performed 25% under capacity.220 The Democratic Party, 
having been in control of the Congress and the presidency, re-
ceived the blame. In the congressional elections of 1894, the 
Democrats dropped from 62% to 29% of the seats in the House 
of ReJ?resentatives, the largest single change in seats in U.S. his-
tory.2 1 In 1896, the Democrats nominated populist William 
Jennings Bryan over the conservative incumbent Grover Cleve-
land. Bryan, however, ran on a platform of minimal government, 
general distrust of urbanization and industrialization, and infla-
tion to relieve farmers' debts. None of those planks appealed to 
urban voters or immigrants. Cities that had always voted De-
mocratic voted Republican for the first time in 1896.222 
217. See, e.g., F.W. TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 481-524 (4th ed. 1946). 
218. JANE GRAVELLE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 226 
(1994). See also Richard C. Edwards, Economic Sophistication in Nineteenth Century 
Congressional Tariff Debates, 30 1. ECON. HIST. 802, 823 (1970) (calling the 1894 tariff 
debates, occupying 100 pages of the Congressional Record, "a classic case of economic 
nonsense"). 
219. Stewart, supra note 204, at 266 (Table 12.1): 
Positions taken in debate showed 
Democrats: 73 in favor of the income tax, 11 moderates (position unclear) 
and 18 opposed. 
Republicans: 3 in favor, 10 moderates (position unclear), and 37 opposed. 
220. Charles Hoffmann, The Depression of the Nineties, 16 1. OF ECON. HISTORY 
137,138-39 (1956). 
221. Offioe of the Oerk, U.S. House of Representative, Politiml Divisions of the House of Rep-
resentatives, http://clerk.house.gov/hist.High/Congressional_History/partyDiv.html (last visited Mar. 
29, 2004) (Republicans climbed from 34% of the seats to 68% of the seats). 
222. Carl N. Degler, American Political Parties and the Rise of the City, 51 J. HIST. 
41,46-50 (1963). 
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With the Democratic collapse, opposition to the income tax 
softened within the majority Republican Party between 1894 and 
1913, when the modern income tax was finally adopted. Oppo-
nents of the income tax in 1898 argued that tax money was 
needed immediately for the Spanish-American War and that 
revenue needs could not await another Supreme Court chal-
lenge.223 Moderately conservative lawyers and economists 
Charles Bullock of Harvard and R.A. Seligman of Columbia224 
became advocates. Progressive Republicans like Robert La Fol-
lette saw the income tax as bringing voters to the Republican 
Party. President Theodore Roosevelt, who was sympathetic to 
progressives on domestic issues, argued for the income tax: "The 
man of great wealth," Roosevelt told Congress in 1906, "owes a 
peculiar obligation to the State, because he derives special ad-
vantages from the mere existence of government."225 In 1908, the 
Republican candidate was Roosevelt's nominee, William How-
ard Taft, and both Taft and his Democratic opponent, again Wil-
liam Jennings Bryan, supported a progressive income tax. Both 
candidates repudiated Pollock.226 
During the Taft administration in 1909, Congress proposed 
the Sixteenth Amendment, which would allow an income tax 
without apportionment among the states. President Howard Taft 
and the conservative Republican leader, Nelson Aldrich, reached 
a compromise. There would be no immediate individual income 
tax in 1909 to force the Court to reconsider Pollock, but Congress 
would adopt an immediate corporate income tax and ~ropose the 
constitutional amendment for ratification by the states. 27 
The Republicans changed their minds on the income tax. In 
1894, Republicans with a position on the income tax had been 
74% opposed.228 In the 1909 proposals for an amendment, they 
223. See Stewart, supra note 204, at 268. 
224. Seligman opposed the 1894 income tax, then supported the 16'h Amendment. 
He was, however, a "gradualist" and opposed the World War I's "excess profits" taxes. 
W. Elliot Brownlee, Economists and the Formation of the Modern Tax System in the 
United States: The World War I Crisis, in THE STATE AND ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE: THE 
AMERICAN AND BRITISH EXPERIENCES 401,405-10 (Mary 0. Furner & Barry E. Supple 
eds. 1990). 
225. Grover Cleveland, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1887), in 3 STATE OF THE 
UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at 2213 (Fred israel ed.) (1966) (em-
phasis added). 
226. RATNER, supra note 206, at 269 (1942). 
227. WEISMAN, supra note 214, at 226-28. Taft claimed later that Aldrich had yielded 
to him. !d. 
228. See Stewart, supra note 204, at 266. In 1894, positions taken in debate showed 
Democrats: 73 in favor of the income tax, 11 moderates (position unclear), and 
18 opposed. 
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were only 18% opposed, and in the 1913legislation, adopting the 
income tax after the amendment was ratified, they were 21% 
opposed.229 Uncompromising, apocalyptic rhetoric also disap-
peared. Senator Aldridge described the income tax of 1894 as a 
proposition advocated only by "Populists or by others who sym-
pathized with them in a desire to redistribute the wealth of the 
United States." In 1909 he said, "Not now, I think."230 Senator 
Jacob Gallinger, Republican of Maine, had declared on the Sen-
ate floor in 1894 that "proposed (income] tax is inequitable, in-
quisitorial, and sectional, and will in time of peace subject the 
people to methods that were well nigh intolerable in time of 
war."
231 By the time of the debates in 1913, however, he an-
nounced that 
I never have brought myself to believe that an income tax is 
an unjust tax, and to-day I cordially give my asset to the 
proposition that, supplemental to the duties that are imposed 
in the bill under consideration, an income tax is a very proper 
d f . . 232 mo e o ra1smg revenue. 
The Sixteenth Amendment was ratified in 42 of 48 states be-
tween 1909 and 1913.233 In the end, even the wealthiest states 
whose citizens would pay disproportionately more tax supported 
the Amendment.234 In 1913, after the Sixteenth Amendment had 
been ratified, Congress enacted the modern income tax. 
Both the 1894 and the 1913 individual income taxes were 
modest, supplemental revenue raisers. Both had an exemption 
level that allowed more than 99% of the population to avoid the 
tax.235 The 1913 tax collected only about 10% of federal revenue. 
Federal alcohol and tobacco taxes were seven times more impor-
Republicans 3 in favor, 10 moderates (position unclear), and 37 opposed. 
229. !d. at 272: In 1909 positions taken in debate showed 
Democrats: 61 in favor of the income tax, 8 moderates (position unclear), and 0 
opposed. 
Republicans: 13 in favor, 32 moderates (position unclear) 
Democrats: 58 in favor of the income tax, 0 moderates (position unclear), and 1 
opposed. 
Republicans: 42 in favor, 5 moderates (position unclear), and 12 opposed. 
230. 44 CONG. REC. 1536 (1909). 
231. 26 CONG. REC. 3893 (1894). 
232. 50 CONG. REC. 3813 (1913). 
233. WEISMAN, supra note 214, at 250-65. 
234. The wealthiest eight states would come to bear 75% of the income tax and all 
but two of them would ratify the amendment. BUENKER, supra note 191, at 9-10, 291, 
306, 179, 319, 310 (reporting that the ratifying states included New York, Ohio, Illinois, 
California, New Jersey, and Maryland, but not Pennsylvania and Michigan). New York, 
which was to bear 35% of the total tax, ratified in 1911. I d. at 10, 291. 
235. BROWNLEE, supra note 211, at 38. 
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tant in terms of yield, and customs were three times more impor-
tant.236 When America entered World War I, however, the in-
come tax exploded in importance. It became the major revenue 
source for the war. With the impact of war on trade, the tariff 
shrank.237 War finance, however, was not anticipated in 1913. 
What had changed between 1894-95 and 1913 was that the in-
come tax was no longer perceived as the front edge of the apoca-
lypse. Pollock was decided in times of perceived class warfare. 
When the panic disappeared, the country as a whole overwhelm-
ingly endorsed the income tax. 
3. Did the Sixteenth Amendment Affirm Pollock? 
Professor Erik Jensen has argued that the reversal of Pol-
lock by constitutional amendment rather than a reenactment of 
the income tax must be understood as an affirmation that the in-
come tax was a direct tax and that apportionment would be nec-
essary absent an amendment.238 That is not how the Sixteenth 
Amendment was understood at the time. 
First, the Sixteenth Amendment drew its political energy from 
the widely held view that Pollock was wrongly decided. Oliver 
Wendell Holmes argued that the comfortable classes in England 
and the United States were frightened of socialism and that the 
fright influenced their decisions in unconscious ways to take "sides 
upon debatable and often burning questions."239 An article in the 
Harvard Law Review expressed faith that "the strong consensus of 
opinion of the legal profession will work out the right":240 
When a court of last resort not only overrules in effect three 
direct adjudications made by itself, but also refines away to 
236. In 1916, the first year for which statistics are available, tariffs collected ap-
proximately $213 million, federal alcohol and tobacco collected over $335 million, and 
the individual income tax collected almost $68 million, or about 10% of the federal total 
revenue. Table Y264-279: Internal Revenue Collections 1863-1957, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, 
at 712-13 (1980). 
237. In 1918, for example, the income taxes generated $3 billion versus $600 million 
in federal alcohol and tobacco taxes, and $180 million in tariffs. !d. Individual income tax 
rates reached a peak of 77% in 1919. BROWNLEE, supra note 211, at 47-58, provides an 
unsympathetic history of World War I's "soak the rich" income tax polices. WEISMAN, 
supra note 214, at 344-46, is more sympathetic. 
238. Jensen, supra note 2, at 1119. 
239. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Pmh of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,467-68 
(1897). 
240. Francis R. Jones, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 9 HARV. L. 
REV. 198, 198 (1895-1896) (arguing that a tax on income from real property might be a 
tax on property economically, but it was not a direct tax on the property). 
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the vanishing point two other of its decisions, and thereby 
cripples an important and necessary power and function of a 
coordinate branch of the government, and delivers an opinion 
in which is laid down a doctrine that is contrary to what has 
been accepted as law for nearly one hundred years, it is nei-
ther improper nor unprofessional carefully and earnestly to 
scrutinize that decision and the authorities and reasons upon 
which it is founded. 241 
Senator Joseph Bailey of Texas argued in the debate over the 
Sixteenth Amendment that "an overwhelming majority of the 
best legal opinion in this Republic believes that [Pollock] was er-
roneous. "
24 
"No decision ... has been so universally condemned 
or its soundness so generally questioned," said Cordell Hull of 
Tennessee (later Secretary of State )_243 
Some of the criticism was sharper. Pollock's five-man ma-
jority consisted of "nullifying judges" who ou£ht to be im-
peached, wrote the former governor of Oregon.2 Cordell Hull 
called Pollock a "palpably erroneous decision stripping a coor-
dinate bod~ of the Government of one its strong arms of power 
and duty." 45 Justice John Harlan, who had dissented from the 
case, described Pollock as a "decision [that] will become as hate-
ful with the American people as the Dred Scott case."246 
From the beginning, the income tax movement followed 
two parallel tracks, one to challenge the Court and force it to re-
treat, and the other to respect the Court as an institution by 
seeking a constitutional amendment. Which fork to take repre-
sented simply a matter of tactics within a unified campaign to de-
feat Pollock. Theodore Roosevelt's State of the Union address 
in 1906 said that Pollock might be overruled, but that a constitu-
tional amendment would follow if it were not: 
As the law now stands it is undoubtedly difficult to devise a 
national income tax which shall be constitutional. But 
241. Id.; see also Edward Whitney, The Income Tax and the Constitution, 20 HARV. 
L. REV. 280, 296 (1907) (saying that the Court had weakened the confidence of the peo-
ple in the judiciary and made the Constitution plastic). 
242. 44 CONG. REC. 1351 (1909). 
243. 44 CONG. REC. 534 (1909) (Cordell Hull (Dem., Tenn.)). 
244. Sylvester Pennoyer, The Income Tax Decision and the Power of the Supreme 
Court to Nullify Act of Congress, 29 AM. L. REv. 550,558 (1895). 
245. MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL, supra note 200, at 59 (1948). 
246. Letter from Justice Harlan to His Sons (May 24, 1895), quoted in David Farrell, 
Justice Harlan's Dissent in the Pollock Case, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 180 (1951); accord, 
EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 589-90 (2d ed. 1914). 
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whether is absolutely impossible is another question and if 
possible it is certainly desirable .... The question is undoubt-
edly very intricate, delicate and troublesome. The decision of 
the court was only reached by one majority .... Nevertheless, 
the difficulty evidently felt by the court as a whole in coming 
to a conclusion, when considered with all the prior decisions 
on the subject, may indicate the possibility of devising a con-
stitutional income-tax law which substantially accomplishes 
the results aimed at ... but if this fails, there will ultimately be 
no alternative to a constitutional amendment.247 
349 
Cordell Hull told the House of Representatives that it was the 
duty of Congress "to invoke every remedy at its command for 
the restoration of that lost [taxing] power," including both are-
enactment of an income tax and an amendment.248 His assess-
ment after the fact was the "the two proposals (for amendment 
and for challenging the Supreme Court] contributed to the suc-
cess of each other. "249 
The decision to pursue a constitutional amendment rather 
than pass an income tax bill inviting the Court to reconsider Pol-
lock arose from respect for the Supreme Court as an institution, but 
not from respect for Pollock. Roosevelt, while energetically oppos-
ing Pollock as law and as policy, said nonetheless that Pollock "is 
the law of the land, and of course accepted as such and loyally 
obeyed by all good citizens."250 President Taft's influence ultimately 
decided the tactical course, and his choice was defended as a matter 
of respect for the Supreme Court. Taft's tax package included both 
an immediate income tax on corporations and a constitutional 
amendment facilitating an income tax on individuals: 
I prefer an income tax, but the truth is that I am afraid of the 
discussion which will follow and the criticism which will ensue 
if there is another serious division in the Supreme Court on 
the subject of the income tax. Nothing has ever injured the 
prestige of the Supreme Court more than [Pollock] and I 
247. Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message, (Dec. 3, 1906), 3 STATE OF THE 
UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES at 2214-15 (Fred Israel 
ed.) (1966); see also Theodore Roosevelt, Seventh Annual Message, (Dec. 3, 1907), 3 
STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES at 2253 
(Fred Israel ed.) (1966) ("Nevertheless a graduated income tax of the proper type would 
be a desirable feature of Federal taxation, and it is hoped that one may be devised which 
the Supreme Court will declare constitutional."). 
248. 44 CONG. REC. 534 (1909) (emphasis added). 
249. MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL, supra note 200, at 60. 
250. Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1906), 3 STATE OF THE 
UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES at 2215 (Fred Israel ed.) 
(1966). 
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think many of the most violent advocates of the income tax 
will be glad of the substitution [of a corporation tax] for same 
reason. I am going to push the Constitutional Amendment, 
which will admit an income tax without question, but I am 
afraid of it without such an amendment.251 
In the same vein, Taft wrote that "I am really in favor of an in-
come tax, but I fear the Court would follow the Pollock case and 
declare it unconstitutional, and I do not desire that." 252 
The Senate Finance Committee decided that "it would be in-
delicate, at least, for the Congress of the United States to pass an-
other measure and ask the Supreme Court to pass upon it, when 
they had already passed upon the proposition."253 Edward Whit-
ney argued in the Harvard Law Review that Pollock had weak-
ened the confidence of the people in the judiciary and made the 
"Constitution plastic on all points," but that a second overruling 
would further undermine the Court, "even to restore the Consti-
tution as originally defined. "254 Moreover, if the Court refused to 
distinguish or overrule Pollock and invalidated the income tax 
again, the public outrage would threaten the institution as a 
whole. In the end, the Congress decided not to challenge the au-
thority or majesty of the Supreme Court, even as it reversed Pol-
lock's core holding that an unapportioned income tax was uncon-
stitutional. The states that ratified the Sixteenth Amendment did 
not believe that they were affirming Pollock. In New Jersey, for 
example, Governor Woodrow Wilson told the state assembly that 
Pollock was based on "erroneous economic reasoning."255 
The Sixteenth Amendment came to bury Pollock, not to 
praise it. 
CONCLUSION: TIME TO SIGN THE DEATH 
CERTIFICATE 
Pollock was not completely overruled by the rapid judicial 
expansion of the definition of "excise tax." The expansion of 
"excise" did allow assaults on wealth in the form of the corpo-
251. Letter from Archibald Taft to Clara Taft (July 1, 1909), in TAFf AND 
ROOSEVELT at 134 (Archie Butted., 1930). 
252. Letter from William Howard Taft to Edward Colston (June 24, 1909), quoted in 
Majorie Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 
66 IND. L. J. 53,98 n. 197 (1990). 
253. 44 CoNG. REC. 3936 (1909) (Senator Frank P. Flint (Rep. Calif.)). 
254. Whitney, supra note 241, at 289. 
255. Quoted in WEISMAN, supra note 214, at 264. 
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rate income tax, the estate tax, and the stock transfer tax. The 
Supreme Court found that every tax that came before it in the 
twenty years after Pollock was an excise tax. Given its rapid ex-
pansion from its modest core, "excise" should be understood as 
a malleable concept that a Court can and should use to avoid 
apportionment. Similarly, Pollock was not technically overruled 
by the Sixteenth Amendment, which merely authorized an in-
come tax?56 Still, the income tax was the last important tax at is-
sue. In the twenty years after the decision, the Court stripped 
Pollock of any impact beyond its facts, and the Sixteenth 
Amendment reversed the case on its facts. The people thought 
they were overruling Pollock in its last redoubt. "Income" is also 
a malleable concept that the Court can use to avoid apportion-
ment. Manipulation of the terms "excise," "duty," and "income" 
to avoid apportionment might be legal fictions, if the terms are 
held to their original meaning, but legal fictions can be sufficient 
tools for reaching the right result. This strategy could go on in-
definitely, always enabling us to distinguish Pollock to avoid ap-
portionment no matter what tax is under consideration. 
Indeed, not only can the courts avoid apportionment by 
manipulative expansion of such terms as "excise" and "income," 
but they have a duty to do so. Apportionment is a silly and de-
bilitating requirement when the tax base is uneven. There is no 
justification for making poorer states pay higher rates and no 
justification in incapacitating taxes needed to pay war debts or 
for any other purpose. No court should ever again veto any fed-
eral tax by imposing the apportionment requirement, now that 
the original purpose of apportionment, discouragement of slav-
ery, has no remaining life. Pollock is a terrible example of bad 
judicial behavior. Today it serves mainly as a precedent to avoid. 
As Justice Harlan called it, it is the Dred Scott of tax. 
Since Pollock should never be followed again, it is time to 
reverse it in full and to return to the case law following Hylton, 
which preceded Pollock. Hylton got it right: a tax that cannot 
reasonably or naturally be apportioned is not a direct tax be-
cause apportionment is the defining characteristic of direct tax. 
Professor Thomas Reed Powell wrote that the public understood 
the Sixteenth Amendment to be a recall of the Pollock decision 
and a restoration of what had gone before.257 Pollock has been 
256. Indeed, in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Court held that a stock 
dividend was not income and thus presumed, without serious discussion of the issue, that 
Pollock would require it to be apportioned. 
257. Thomas Reed Powell, Srock Dividends, Direct Taxes and the Sixteenth Amend-
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beaten back by the Court, by the other two branches of the fed-
eral government, and by the states that ratified the Sixteenth 
Amendment. Apportionment is too stupid a requirement ever to 
be applied again. 
ment, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 536,538 (1920). 
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